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Introduction
The present work investigates some of the consequences on the economic growth
of countries involved in the globalization process, which consists on the opening of
domestic markets to the international exchanges.
The main references have been taken from the researcher Kiminori Matsuyama, in
particular from his fundamental paper “Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-
Breaking and Endogenous Inequality of Nations” [10] and from the adaptation to the
two-country case, operated by Tomoo Kikuchi and John Stachurski in “Endogenous
inequality and fluctuations in a two-country model” [8] (see below for further details).
Therefore, our basic scheme consists in describing the effects from autarky to the
case of two-country integrated markets, making different hypotheses about which
markets are open: factor markets solely (Chapter 1), factor and financial markets
(Chapter 1), financial markets solely (Chapter 2 and 3). In each case an Overlapping
Generations model is considered.
The essay is composed by two parts and three chapters.
In both parts, an OLG model, from Diamond’s family, is employed.1
A sequence of overlapping generations is considered, each one living through two
different periods. Agents are respectively denoted as “young” and “old”. The young
have an endowment of labor; they supply it inelastically to the labor market and
receive an income.
In the first chapter, the young have to decide how much to consume and how much
to save. Then they have to decide whether to lend their savings or to become
entrepreneurs, in order to maximize their second period consumption.
In the second and third chapter, the young do not consume in the first part of their
life, but invest all their income, for the second period-second age. Eventually the
old receive their output from the productive process of final goods, consume it and
exit.
There is only one kind of good, suitable for every economic dealing.
There are two productive processes. The first produces consumer goods; it starts
and ends during each period and utilizes two factors, labor and capital, according to
a neoclassical productive function. The second concerns the production of physical
capital and covers two periods. It takes in input savings (goods not consumed by
the young agents) and, in the next period, converts them in capital factors; its
technology is supposed to be linear.2.
In the first part, perfect markets are considered, while in the second part an hy-
pothesis of credit rationing is admitted.
1For a description of the Diamond model see Romer [14]
2If we interpret physical capital as “human”, then this second production process may be intended
as the educational system.
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Part I - Chapter 1.
In the first part, consisting of a single chapter, we use a standard OLG model to
analyze the effects on economic growth caused by the opening of perfect markets of
factors and credit. We take under consideration different cases: at first, factor mar-
kets are integrated, and financial markets are closed; then, all markets are assumed
to be open. We prove that no matter if the markets are open or closed, in the long
run, economies always converge to an equilibrium of steady state, influenced by the
efficiency of the countries in producing capital and consumer goods. We also prove
that the map, whose repeated application represents the dynamic behavior of the
economic system, is a continuous one, but with some non differentiable points, and
we are able to characterize the conditions under which production of final goods
occurs in the most efficient region, or in both.
Part II - Chapters 2 and 3.
In the second part, structured in two chapters (the second and the third of the the-
sis), we introduce a new axiomatic picture that allows us to obtain more articulated
results in the long run dynamics, characterized by endogenous fluctuations.
In order to put specific attention on financial globalization phenomena, only the
credit markets are assumed to be open, while the others are closed to the interna-
tional exchanges.
Now agents are supposed to consume only during the second period of their life;
in this way all their wages become savings. This particular hypothesis (commonly
accredited in specific literature) induces, of course, a simplification of the model, but
it allows us to concentrate on the main maximizing choice of the young agents: to
lend or to borrow the resources available in the economy. Particularly, under some
reasonable hypotheses, we can prove that agents need to borrow in order to become
entrepreneurs.
The main hypothesis of this second part is that credit markets are assumed to be
imperfect: borrowers are supposed to repay their debts only if the cost of the obliga-
tion is smaller than the cost of the default, which is taken to be a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1)
of the project output. According to the condition by which agents need to borrow
in order to start their investment project, this hypothesis introduces a borrowing
constraint in addition to the more common profitability constraint. Moreover, when
the countries lie in autarky, credit market imperfection doesn’t affect equilibrium
levels; in this case it has an impact only on the interest rate, that adjusts in order to
balance savings and investment. Differently, when financial markets are integrated,
the credit market imperfections have significant consequences on the steady states of
the long run. The map describing the two-country economic development becomes
a piece-wise two-dimensional one, and the plane of significant states is divided into
four regions, conforming to the fact that the j-country is borrowing-not borrowing
constrained (for j = home / abroad, respectively).
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In Chapter 2 we focus on the case of perfect symmetry, assuming that the economies
are identical in all their basic features.
Until their markets are closed, countries stay in their long run equilibrium of autarky,
that is unique and asymptotically stable. Opening their financial markets, multiple
steady states may occur, introducing, in this way, asymmetrical position between
the countries. We also prove that the equilibrium of autarky still remain, but it
might change its features of stability. In particular, even when it becomes a saddle,
it preserves a stable set of positive Lebesgue measure acting, in this way, as a Milnor
attractor.
Choosing a production function from the Cobb-Douglas family we are able to depict
a global analysis of the economic environment.
In the third Chapter, we gradually introduce heterogeneity between the countries.
Firstly, as in Kikuchi and Stachurski [8], we consider only the differences in the
population size. We prove that the autarky equilibrium preserves some features
analogous to the ones of the symmetric case. Then we depict a periodic dynamic
constituted by a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
Our thesis is that periodic phenomena derive not only by differences in population
size, as in Kikuchi and Stachurski, but are also due to heterogeneity in technology
and credit market imperfection.
In doing that we introduce the hypothesis of complete heterogeneity between the
two countries and prove the existence of periodic dynamics, characterized by cycli-
cal phenomena and a crater bifurcation. Particularly, we prove the possibility of
long run behavior in which countries run continuously from constrained and not
constrained credit situations.
Finally we introduce the hypothesis of “quasi heterogeneity” assuming differences in
technologies and credit market imperfections, but equal populations. Even in this
case we are able to prove the existence of a crater bifurcation and, in this way, we
consider definitely proved our thesis.
In the following, before introducing the specific analysis of the models, we offer an
overview of the main literature on the topic.
An overview on the main literature.
Over the past two decades, macroeconomic implications of credit market imperfec-
tions, in the globalization process, have been investigated by a number of researchers;
their efforts have constituted a conspicuous body of results and offer a reach liter-
ature on the topic. Hence we will propose a brief summary of some of the basic
papers on the subject.
In his paper “Financial market globalization, symmetry-breaking, and endogenous
inequality of nations” [10] Matsuyama focuses on the effects of financial market
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globalization on the inequality of the nations. According to the mainstream, glob-
alization would activate financial flows from the rich countries to the poor ones,
constituting an impulse of developing for the poor economies. But as many re-
searchers have highlighted, this mechanism fails in the case of imperfect markets.
In that case, the more financial security that a rich and well-developed country can
offers rather than a poor and not well-developed one, may inverts the natural flow
of the wealth; when this happens, globalization magnifies the inequality, the poor
countries become poorer and the rich richer. For these reasons, some researchers
believe that governments of poor countries must act in order to prevent the outflows
of domestic savings and that the rich countries must aid the poor ones to overtake
their lack of development. Considering that the debut often experiences a strong
polarity of the opposite factions, the author tries to conciliate these contrasting opin-
ions. In doing that, he draws a Diamond overlapping generations model relative to
a continuum of inherently identical countries, in which two generations, the old an
the young, coexist in each period and respectively supply labor and physical capital,
as input factors for the production of a unique final good. The goods produced in
period t, may be consumed or invested in the production of physical capital that
will become available in period t+ 1. For hypothesis the marginal return of capital
is decreasing relative to the capital itself and this makes the productivity of invest-
ment higher in the poor countries than in the rich ones. This is an equalizing force
that tends to transfer the wealth from the rich to the poor economies. Another key
hypothesis is the imperfection of the credit market, depicted in this way: lenders
believe that borrowers, having to choose between the default and the repay of their
debts, will run the first option rather than to pay more than a fixed percentage (the
measure of imperfection) of their earnings. This makes an unequalizing force, that
pushes wealth in the opposite direction relative to the one due to the hypothesis of
decreasing productivity. When it is in autarky, in spite of credit imperfection, the
world economy has a unique, symmetric and globally stable steady state. Within
each country, the interest rate adjusts in order to balance savings and investments.
So different countries face with different domestic interest rates, but reach the same
steady state. When financial integration starts to operate, under certain conditions,
symmetry breaking may occur: the symmetric steady state loses its stability and
others stable asymmetric steady states come to exist. The fact is that, after the fi-
nancial integration, there exists a unique interest rate in the world; this means that
the interest rate continues to balance savings and investment but only globally; in-
stead it stops to make equilibrium within the single country. Now savings can freely
run across the frontiers and tend to escape from the more disadvantaged countries
and move towards the more advantaged ones. The situation of stable asymmetric
steady state pictures a world polarized into poor and rich countries; the first in-
volved by the borrowing constraint, the second free. In this case the rich are richer,
the poor are poorer and the total world output is smaller than in the symmetric
case. These results are important for two reasons. First, they prove that in some
cases, globalization may magnifies inequality between nations, and give a theoretical
support to the popular belief that globalization sometimes makes the rich countries
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richer at the expense of the poor ones. Second, the model depicts a mechanism that
depends on relative wealth and tends to reproduces itself continuously; this means
that there is no advantage in cutting off the rich countries and connecting the poor:
the division between rich and poor will replicate itself into the new group. This
is contrary to the popular belief. However, symmetry-breaking is not unavoidable;
it occurs under certain parameter values; particularly, it needs a sufficiently large
credit market imperfection. The paper depicts sufficient and necessary conditions
for the symmetry breaking equilibrium and, more in general, for all the possible
steady states of the system. The fundamental policy implication of the theory is
that situations of undeveloped economies can not be taken on as isolated problems,
but need to be considered under a global approach, as part of an interrelated net of
many countries. Depending on a set of initial conditions, globalization may bring
a real progress for all the participating countries, but, under other conditions, may
cause a declining for the poorer ones.
Kikuchi and Stachurski [8] have developed a two-country version of Matsuyama’s
model described above, in which the world economy is made by two large countries,
with the same economic features. Agents live for two periods, work in the first
and consume in the second; the young agents supply labor, while the old ones
supply capital factors. After the production and the distribution of the output are
completed, the old consume and exit the model, while the young invest all their
wages. The credit market is imperfect, and borrowers face two constraints: the first
marks the convenience to invest rather than to lend, while the second comes from the
rationing of the credit due to the imperfection of the market. Like in Matsuyama’s
the financial imperfection is represented assuming that debtors are supposed to not
credibly pay more than a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of their expected earnings. When
the countries are isolated, their interest rate balances their domestic savings and
investment, and in this way the imperfection of credit markets never binds the
accumulation of capital, that tends to a symmetric, asymptotically stable point of
steady state. On the contrary, when financial markets are integrated, savings can
freely flow from one country to another and equivalence between domestic savings
and investment is no more guaranteed. In this case, under certain parametrization,
the symmetric steady state becomes unstable and asymmetric stable steady states
start existing. In addition, considering a diversification on population sizes of the
two countries, the authors prove the existence of endogenous periodic phenomena
like stable cycles. Summarizing the model depicts phenomena of symmetry-breaking
like in the Matsuyama’s one but, adopting the hypothesis of two countries, is able
to extend the analysis outside of the steady states and to intercept the presence of
periodic dynamics.
Continuing on the fundamental question, whether or not financial globalization is
good for all the participating countries, Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull [12] high-
light the thesis by which only a well-designed domestic financial system, as result
of well-designed domestic political and social systems, allows to enjoy the positive
effects of the financial globalization. Taking this suggestion, they investigate the
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possible consequences of joining credit markets, for countries whose domestic fi-
nancial markets are not sufficiently and uniformly developed. In doing that they
hypothesize the presence of markets limited in the amount of borrowing, assuming
that limit as measure of the degree of financial undevelopment; then they consider a
model of financial integration among countries heterogeneous in their degree of do-
mestic financial development. They prove that, in this case, welfare consequences of
liberalization may be different from one country to another. Particularly, the most
financially developed country will experience an increase in its aggregate welfare,
and the less developed one, a decrease. This occurs because the financial inte-
gration increases the cost of borrowing, relative to the autarky situation, to poor
agents in the less developed country and decreases it in the more developed one.
The authors conclude affirming that, this adverse phenomenon can be contrasted by
a redistribution of initial wealth in the less developed countries; this can lead to a
situation in which the aggregate welfare effects are positive for all the participants.
Angeletos and Panousi [3] deal with the theoretical problem to justify the empirical
evidence that, in many cases, the direction of capital flows seems to be in contrast
with the neoclassical paradigm: not from the rich to the poor countries, neither from
slow-growing to the fast-growing, but actually in the opposite sense. Their paper
analyzes the global macroeconomic effects of financial integration, in the presence
of an uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk. This risk induces entrepreneurs
to make a self-insure against it and generates a wedge between the interest rate and
the marginal product of capital, because of the private assurance the entrepreneurs
pretend in compensation for the risk they face in their activity. This wedge is likely
to vary across countries, and in some of them is much higher than in others. In
their model, the authors consider the case of two economies, the “North” and the
“South”, populated by a continuum of families, each family including a worker and
an entrepreneur. The two countries differ for the level of uninsurable risk, that
is low in the North and high in the South. Before the financial integration, the
South faces with a lower interest rate than the North, due to its stronger demand
for precautionary savings, and with a lower capital stock due to a higher wedge
between the marginal product of capital and the interest rate. After the financial
integration, the interest rate tends to rise up in the South, increasing the opportunity
cost of the capital and, in this way, depressing the capital stock, the wages and the
final product. The South experiences a depressed period, while the North knows a
boom. This explains why financial globalization may initially increase cross-country
inequality and capital may often fail to flow from the rich countries to the poor ones.
However the long run effects may be different. During the time the agents of the
South, saving abroad at higher return than domestically, will be able to accumulate
more and more wealth, in such a way increasing their willingness to assume risk and
diminishing the wedge between the interest rate and the return of capital. Now the
situation is overturned, the economy of the North tends to slacken, while the one of
the South to develop. As a result, the South can reach a better condition than the
previous one of autarky. Anyway this happens only in the long run. It is to be noted
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that, in the short-run the South’s poor tends to become poorer for two reasons: the
increase in the cost of borrowing due to the increase in the interest rate, and the
reduction of the wages as a consequence of the initial outflow of capital due to the
greater convenience, for the South’s rich, to invest in the North. On the contrary
the South’s rich gain because of the higher return of their savings and the lower cost
of labor in their private activities.
Summarizing, the South has to survive to the first inequality period of globalization;
later the new generation of agents will generally gain the benefits of the reform.
Again, in order to justify the evidence that many less-developed countries receive
little net credit or no credit at all, from the more developed ones, and that, in
general terms, globalization seems not to work in the direction of an international
equalization of capital stocks and productive levels, Boyd and Smith [5] develop
a model based on the concept of costly state verification (CSV). It is known that
CSV problem has been analyzed by Townsend [15] in the theory of contracts and
consists in the optimization problem connected to a contract, in which lender has to
decide whether to pay for monitoring borrower’s performance or not. On one hand,
verification has obviously a cost for the sponsor; on the other hand, no verification
allows the borrower to hide the realized profits. In general terms, this problem intro-
duces an external cost on the financing exchange. The authors prove the possibility
of endogenous cyclical fluctuations due to the presence of credit rationing, because
of the CSV phenomenon. They consider a two-country Diamond model in which
economies open only their financial markets and in which allocation of funds are
penalized by the CSV problem, so that credit is rationed. Countries are identical
in every aspect, but differ in their initial capital stocks. When closed, each country
lies in a unique, not trivial equilibrium, asymptotically stable. Economy converges
to it without fluctuations and the only effect of the asymmetric information is the
reduction of the capital stock of equilibrium, relative to the one of full information.
When the two countries join their financial markets, the situation changes signifi-
cantly. Under some particular hypotheses, the authors can prove the existence of
at least three nontrivial steady states. One of these is the “old” steady state of
autarky; it is symmetric and, in that case, the net-capital-flow from one country
to the other is zero. The other two are asymmetric, with one country that has a
permanently higher level of capital stock, income and final good. This situation is
particularly unequal because the rich country is richer and the poor is poorer than
in the autarky case. Also, the total amount of capital stock in the world is less
than in autarky and the poor country is a net lender to the rich one. Differences
in capital stocks across countries affect labor incomes and, in this way, the capacity
of entrepreneurs to contrast the CSV obstacle.This is the basic mechanism. When
in autarky economies identically converge to the unique point of steady state, but
when the financial markets are integrated, the country with a higher capital stock
has a bigger capacity in contrasting the CSV effect and it can attract more resources
from the international loans. This last fact balances the difference in the marginal
product of capital between the two countries (the country with the higher capital
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stock has the lower marginal product) and makes an asymmetrical equilibrium in
which one country permanently has a higher capital stock than the other.
Before Boyd and Smith, Bernanke and Gertler [4] highlighted the weight of borrower
solvency, introducing the concept of costly state verification (CSV). They consider
the borrower net worth as inversely correlated to the CSV and derive two implica-
tions. First, considering that the net worth of borrowers is generally pro-cyclical,
because entrepreneurs are more solvent when the economy is going well than when
it is going bad, there will be a decline of agency costs during the periods of economic
development and an increase during the recession ones. The authors prove that this
may produce investment fluctuations and persistent cycles. Second, they also prove
that shocks to borrower net worth, which are independent of aggregate output, may
also cause occurrence of real fluctuations.
Carrying on the branch of research above, in his paper “Endogenous Inequality”
[9] Matsuyama deals with the question of which are the determinant factors of
the wealth distribution across households in the long run. His model considers a
population made by infinitely-lived households that may differ only for the level
of wealth. In each period, the distribution of wealth influences the supply and
the demand for credit; the credit, in turn, influences the distribution of wealth of
the consecutive period. For hypothesis the credit market is borrowing constrained,
because the entrepreneurs are supposed to opt for the cost of the default, rather
than pay more than a fraction of their project output. Because the more convenient
project requires a minimum level of investment and credit is constrained, it follows
that only the relatively rich households can borrow and become entrepreneurs, while
the relatively poor families can only become lenders. The interest rate of equilibrium
determines endogenously the threshold between the rich and the poor. The model
identifies two possible scenarios with opposite consequences. In a “virtuous” scenario
the strong demand for credit tends to produce an increase of the interest rate and of
the wealth of the lenders. The gap between the rich and the poor tends to disappear,
and these two categories move towards a unique steady state in which all the agents
will be rich enough to borrow and to become entrepreneurs. In this case a net flow
of wealth runs from the rich to the poor agents; these last are pulled out of their
poverty by the rich. On the contrary, another scenario depicts a situation in which
the population is polarized into the rich and the poor and changing is not possible.
The poor agents are unable to borrow and can only lend their savings to the rich
ones that, in turn, pay the poor an interest rate lower than the project return.
So, the rich become richer and the poor poorer. Summarizing, the model offers a
theoretical justification to the fact that, sometimes, the rich owe their wealth to the
poor.
Also Matsuyama, in “Credit Traps and Credit Cycles” [11], tries to analyze the
consequences of credit market imperfections on aggregate investment through the
composition of the credit. The author observes that composition is normally consid-
ered as important as the volume of credit, since many government institutions have
the explicit goal of redirecting the credit flow towards more social useful forms of
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investment. Hence he proposes a model of credit market imperfections with hetero-
geneous investment projects. Credit tends to go towards the project that generates
the highest rate of return. Moreover because of the borrowing constraint, the most
profitable project for the lenders is not necessarily the most productive one. In fact
the borrower net worth is, among others thinks, responsible of the determination
of the project with the highest return. Therefore, movements in the borrower net
worth can endogenously affect the investment projects. In this way, the investment
technologies are influenced by the credit composition. In turn, the changes in in-
vestment technologies affect the borrower net worth. This interaction leads to a
number of nonlinear phenomena such as credit traps, credit cycles, etc.
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee [1] analyze the role of financial factors as a source
of instability for a small open economy. In their model they hypothesize the case of a
small open economy, which produces a single tradeable good, employing two factors,
capital and a country-specific skilled labor factor. For hypothesis, firms cannot
borrow more than µ times the amount of their current level of investible funds; in
this way, µ represents a measure of the degree of development (undevelopment) of
the credit market. The authors intercept a basic mechanism by which economies that
know an intermediate level of financial development - not very developed, neither
very undeveloped - are the more exposed to destabilizing effects due to the financial
globalization. This is the sequence: greater investment leads to greater output
and profits, which permit to borrow more savings and realize more investment. The
economy of the country starts to rise and new capital flows from the foreign countries.
But, at the same time, the rise in investment increases the demand for the country-
specific factor and, consequently, its price relative to the final good. This depresses
the profits and now a new opposite chain of cause-and-effect begins: less profits, less
credit, less investment and, finally, a fall in the output level. This mechanism does
not significantly involve firms that enjoy a very high level of financial development,
because they are not generally constrained by cash-flow levels, neither it involves
firms that lie in a very low level of development, because these last are anyway
constrained. On the contrary, “intermediate” economies may experience periods
of instability due to cash-flow shocks that hit their capacity to obtain credit. This
endogenous instability may cause persistent effects and, in extreme cases, limit cycles
dynamics.
Daniel and Jones [7] face the problem that, as confirmed in many cases, financial
liberalization often leads to financial crises. Even if they recognize the weight of
explanations based on the weakness of banking systems, they develop a more dy-
namic model in which they prove how financial liberalization can produce, in and
of itself, instability and banking crises. In their model, they consider a small open
economy, just embarked on the international financial markets, therefore during a
transition period that is the riskiest, even if its banking system is well-designed and
its banks are safe, relatively to the long run equilibrium. It is reasonable to assume
that, at the beginning of the financial liberalization, there are a small capital stock
and a limited bank net worth. For hypothesis the financial sector of the model is
9
composed by some foreign competitors and a single domestic bank that initially
takes advantage from the inexperience of the foreign creditors and enjoys the high
rate of internal marginal product, due to the small stock of capital of the country.
Therefore the bank obtains high interest rates for its loans, it faces little default
risk, even in presence of high leverage, it tends to retain most of its earnings and
it experiences a period of net worth growing. But, through time, the capital stock
grows and its marginal product falls; the foreign lenders become more expert and
start to grant cheaper loans; the domestic bank’s profit starts to fall and is expected
to fall even further. This is the riskiest period, in which banking crises are most
likely. If the bank will survive it probably will adopt a more conservative behavior
and a lower leverage. The authors conclude with a policy recommendation, that is
increasing bank capitalization, especially before the liberalization. Of course this
has to be compared with the welfare loss due to diverted resources (the ones of
capitalization) from alternative uses.
10
Part I.
A two-Country OLG model with a
perfect, financial market
11
We consider an infinite-horizon overlapping generations model, in discrete time,
belonging to the Diamond’s family.
The economy is assumed to be “perfectly neoclassical”, factors are paid at their
marginal return, markets are competitive and there are no informative asymmetries
between the agents.
First we will consider a closed economy, then the case of two countries, that interact
with each other.
The aim of the model is essentially to explain the challenges from the closed situa-
tion, to the opening one, particularly referring to the process of capital accumulation.
The case of the two countries will be investigated without any distinction about
relative dimensions, but under the hypothesis of differentiated relative capacity in
producing capital goods. We will see that, in presence of a neoclassical axiomatic
context, even in case of open economies, the law of motion of capital accumulation
has no jumping, and tends to a unique steady state point, in a continuous manner.
Moreover, we will prove that the entire process is governed by the interest factor,
supposing agents take it as given, without trying to influence it. Time will be
assumed discrete.
12
1. A two-Country OLG model with a
perfect, financial market
1.1. Basic assumptions.
We consider an infinite-horizon overlapping generations model in discrete time, with
two sectors, consumption and production. There’s only one kind of goods, useful
for every economic dealing.
In each period there are two generations of agents, the “old” and the “young”. So,
people live for two periods. When they are young, they work and when they become
old, they retire. The young divide their wages in two parts, one for consumption,
one for savings, in order to assure consumption during the second part of their life,
when they will become old and they will be out of the labor market.
The production sector. It is supposed to be an infinitely lived neoclassical firm,
which combines two factors of production, capital and labor, entirely consumed at
the end. The final goods may be consumed in the first period, or invested for the
second to produce new capital. So there are two productive processes, respectively of
consumer goods and of capital goods. The first starts and ends during each period,
while the second starts in a period and ends in the later.
Final goods never survive their period of production, so the only way they have to
be transferred to the next period, is to be invested. What is not consumed is saved
and what is saved is invested.
The production of consumer goods. Per capita output in period t, is obtained by
yt = f (kt), where kt denotes capital per worker and f : R+ → R+ is the production
function in intensive form.
For every kt ∈ R+ it is assumed that:
i0) f (kt) ∈ C2 (R+)
i1) f (0) = 0
i2) f
′ (kt) > 0
i3) f
′′ (kt) < 0
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First Inada’s condition:
i4) lim
kt→0+
f
′ (kt)=+∞
Second Inada’s condition:
i5) lim
kt→+∞
f
′ (kt) = 0
Non vanishing labor share property:
i6) lim
kt→0+
ktf
′ (kt)
f(kt) ∈ [0, 1) 1
Perfect competitiveness of factor markets, these last remunerated at their marginal
productiveness:
i7) wt ≡ W (kt) =f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt) (for the remuneration of labor)2
i8) ρt= f
′ (kt) (for the remuneration of capital)
Minimum elasticity of substitution property:
i9) σ (kt) > 1− ktf(kt) ,
where σ (kt) = f
′ (kt)W (kt)
f(kt)W ′ (kt)
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
The production of capital goods. The production of capital goods starts in the
first period and ends in the second one. We assume that 1 unit of goods invested in
t (saved in t) returns R > 0 units of capital in period t+ 1.
Consumption and investment. The consumption sector is represented by two pe-
riods living overlapping generations of consumers, the old and the young. Each
generation consists of a continuum of homogeneous agents, with unit mass and, for
hypothesis, there is no population growth.3 Young consumers are endowed with
one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically to the competitive labor market.
1If the productive factors are remunerated at their marginal productiveness, then output f (kt)
has to be divided into two shares, kf
′
(k)
f(k) and 1 − kf
′
(k)
f(k) , in order to remunerate capital and
labor respectively. Until kf
′
(k)
f(k) 6= 1, the labor share will not be zero.
2Being W ′ (kt) =−ktf ′′ (kt), from i3 it follows that W (kt) is an increasing function of kt.
3The hypothesis of normalization of population consists on that agents must be thought like the
set of real numbers covering a unit segment I.
Suppose a quantity q (x) of a certain endowment (wage, savings, capital, etc.) belongs to
each agent x, from a group covering a portion λ of population I. Then the total quantity of the
endowment into the population is
´ λ
q (x) dx. Particularly, if q (x) = q = constant, the total
quantity is
´ λ
qdx = qλ. For example, if half of young earn a wage w, then the total wage of
the entire population is w2 . Most of all, if each agent has an endowment q, the quantity of the
endowment that can be found into the population is exactly q.
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Investment project requires a minimum of one unit of consumption goods for in-
vestment in period t and returns R > 0 units of physical capital in period t + 1.
Produced capital goods can be rented to final commodity producing firm.
For formal simplicity, it can be assumed that returns of the period will be disposable
at the end of the same one. So, at the end of the first period (instant t), each worker
will earn wt; he will consume the share c1t and invest st = wt − c1t, in order to
assure the consumption c2t+1, from the production of second period (t + 1); the
latter obtained because of new capital goods derived from investment st.
After received his income wt, agent has to decides how much to consume and how
much to save. Again, he has to decide whether to become a depositor, or an en-
trepreneur, and run a discrete, indivisible investment project. So, at time t, agent
has two possible alternatives (let rt+1 be the second period lending/borrowing re-
turn):
a) if he becomes a depositor, then his second period consumption will be
c2t+1 = strt+1;
b) if he becomes an entrepreneur, at the end, he will consume
c2t+1 = Rf
′ (kt+1)− (1− st) rt+1
Options a) and b) involve a non-arbitrage condition:
strt+1 = Rf
′ (kt+1)− (1− st) rt+1 ⇒
rt+1 = Rf
′ (kt+1) [1.1]
It means: on offering one unit of goods (not consuming it) agent has contributed to
produce Rf ′ (kt+1) units of goods. This is exactly what is expected to gain on the
exchange. 4
The resource constraint. Considering that one unit of savings invested in period
t produces R units of capital in period t+ 1, and that factors are entirely consumed
during the production process, it follows that the total stock of capital in the second
period is:
kt+1 = Rst resource constraint [1.2]
4Relation [1.1] can be seen as a result of the profitability condition:
Rf
′ (kt+1)− (1− st) rt+1 ≥ strt+1; this pushes the agents to become entrepreneurs, instead
of lenders.
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Remark. Relation [1.2] may be interpreted as the traditional inter-temporal con-
straint over the two periods, for an overlapping generations model.
In fact, st = wt − c1t and, from [1.1] , R = rt+1f ′ (kt+1) . Substituting into [1.2]:
kt+1f
′ (kt+1) = rt+1 (wt − c1t). The left hand side of the latter relation is the share
of per capita product, due to capital factor owners: c2t+1 = kt+1f
′ (kt+1). Then
the relation becomes c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt that is the usual inter-temporal consumer
constraint.
1.1.1. The optimization process
The optimum choice of the young agents.
We choose an utility function of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type:
U (c1t, c2t+1)
(β>0)
=

c1−γ1t −1
1−γ +β
c1−γ2t+1−1
1−γ if 0 < γ < 1
ln (c1t) + βln (c2t+1) if γ = 1
Proposition 1.1. 5
Depending on γ, the optimum choices of young agents and the marginal propensities
of savings are:
For γ = 1: cˆ1t =
wt
1+β
cˆ2t+1 = β1+βwtrt+1
[1.3]
and
S (β) = β1+β [1.4]
For 0 < γ < 1:

cˆ1t = wt
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
cˆ2t+1 = wt(βrt+1)
1
γ
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
[1.5]
5For this and the following propositions, see the Appendix to Chapter 1, for a detailed proof.
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and
S (rt+1) = (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
[1.6]
The law of motion. The previous results and the relations [1.1], [1.2] permit to
derive the law of motion of the model:
rt+1 = Rf
′ (kt+1)
kt+1 = RS (rt+1)W (kt)
⇒
kt+1
S(Rf ′ (kt+1)) = RW (kt) [1.7]
Proposition 1.2.
kt+1 is a monotonic increasing function of kt and R:
kt+1 = ψ (kt,R) [1.8]
Proposition 1.3.
(0;R) is a forward invariant set for kt+1 = ψ (kt, R).
There is only one global, not trivial steady state k? 6= 0, asymptotically stable.
Remark. From the last proposition and the resource constraint [1.2], it follows that
Rst < R; hence st < 1. Therefore it is proved that agents need to borrow, in order
to become entrepreneurs.
Remark. Because 0 < st < 1 it follows that some agents will be borrowers and
others will be lenders.
Letm be the number of the borrowers. Then n = 1−m is the number of the lenders.
The total borrowed goods will be m (1− st) and the total lent goods will be nst.
These two quantities must be equal, so m (1− st) = nst. This, with the previous
m+ n = 1, implies m = st and n = 1− st.6
6Alternatively, if m is the number of agents that run the investment project, because everyone
brings one unit of savings, it must be m = st.
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1.2. Two Countries
Now let us consider a world economy composed of two countries of the previous
kind. We refer to these countries using h meaning home and a meaning abroad.
The heterogeneity between these two countries consists in their initial capital holding
and in their efficiency in producing capital goods. In particular, it can be can
assumed, without loss of generality, that Rh > Ra.
Two different cases will be considered separately.
At first it will be analyzed the situation in which there is free trade between coun-
tries, but the financial markets are closed, so borrowing and lending take place only
domestically.
Later we will study the condition of complete opening, with free trade in consump-
tion, capital and financial goods across countries.
Remark. In these hypotheses, there will be some differences between the case
0 < γ < 1 and the case γ = 1.
Particularly, when γ = 1, savings do not depend on interest rate but they are always
a fixed ratio of income. Whether or not financial markets are open, savings are the
same in the two countries and are exactly sht = sat = st =
(
β
1+β
)
W (kt).
On the contrary, when 0 < γ < 1, profitability condition will tend to concentrate
investments in the more productive country.
1.2.1. Free trade, but financial market closed
In the following, we will suppose there is free trade between the two countries con-
cerning consumer goods and productive factors. On the contrary, the financial
markets will be considered closed.
Proposition 1.4.
In the two countries the following relations occur:
kht = kat = kt , rht > rat , sht ≥ sat .
Proposition 1.5.
The law of motion that represents the formation of the new capital is:
kt+1 =12W (kt)
[
RhS
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
+ RaS
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)]
[1.9]
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Proposition 1.6.
(0;Rh) ⊂
(
0;R(+)
)
is a forward invariant interval for kt+1.7
kt+1 converges to a unique, non trivial and globally asymptotically stable fixed point
k∗ ∈ (0;Rh).
1.2.2. Free trade and integrated deposit markets
Let us consider now the situation in which capital goods are freely tradeable across
countries and deposit markets operate internationally. This implies equalization of
capital stocks, as well as deposit rates: ∀t : kht = kat = kt and rht = rat = rt.
Following the previous hypothesis, countries are different in efficiency, so Rh > Ra.
If kt+1 is the new value of capital, that comes from a first period capital stock kt,
then the maximum that agents running an investment project in h can pay, in return
for each unit of saving borrowed, is Rhf
′ (kt+1); on the contrary, the entrepreneurs
of a can only offer Raf
′ (kt+1).
Therefore Raf
′ (kt+1) ≤ rt+1 ≤ Rhf ′ (kt+1). Notice that agents keep the interest
rate as given and they never try to influence it.
When there are little savings, we can suppose that the production of capital goods
should be concentrated on the h-Country.
The lower are the savings, the higher is its cost; the maximum will be:
rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1); that is the return of capital h-agents can obtain from one unit
of investment.
On the contrary, when there are a lot of savings, production of capital goods will
occur either in h and in a Country; in this case, the interest factor will be:
rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1).
Then there’s an intermediate situation, when production occurs only in h, but rt+1
is less than the return of investment in h, but more than in a.
Now we know that the agent starting an investment project needs to offer an amount
of 1 unit of goods.
Therefore, supposing a unit mass population, the total amount of goods invested,
in each country, must not be bigger than 1.
But the total amount of savings is sht + sat and this, in conjunction with the interest
factor, offers a criterion to establish if production will take place in one or two
countries.
7R(+) is the smallest number for which the equation W (x)S
(
xf
′ (x)
)
= 1 is satisfied. If this
equation doesn’t have solution, then R(+) = +∞. See Appendix to Chapter 1 - proof of
proposition 1.3.
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i) Suppose it is rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1). In this case, production of capital goods will
take place only in h-Country; if not there will be a minor interest factor. Then it
will be sht + sat ≤ 1.
ii) Suppose it is rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1). The production of capital goods will necessary
take place in each country, especially in the less efficient a, otherwise the interest
factor will not be so low. It means that the production in the h-Country is saturated.
Therefore, it must be sht + sat > 1.
iii) Finally, suppose it is Raf
′ (kt+1) < rt+1 < Rhf
′ (kt+1). Capital goods will be
produced only in the home Country, otherwise rt+1 would be Raf
′ (kt+1). But now
savings are payed less than their maximum productivity. The only possibility is that
sht + sat = 1; all agents in the h-Country are entrepreneurs and their profitability
constraint is valid, with the sign “>”, while agents in the a-Country are all lenders.
These last strictly prefer to borrow than to start an investment project, because in
that way their return is greater.
We will analyze these three situations in the following part, beginning with the
hypothesis 0 < γ < 1.
Then we will consider the alternative hypothesis γ = 1 .
1.2.2.1. The case rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1) and 0 < γ < 1
Savings are paid at their maximum value, capital goods are produced solely in the h-
Country and sht + sat ≤ 1. This last relation involves st ≤ 12 , because in each country
there will be the same share of savings: sht = sat = st = W (kt)S
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
.
In equilibrium, only agents in home Country will be indifferent between becoming
lenders or entrepreneurs, while agents in foreign Country would strictly prefer to
become lenders.
Proposition 1.7.
Under hypotheses rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1) and 0 < γ < 1, the law of formation of new
capital is:
kt+1
S(Rhf ′ (kt+1))=RhW (kt) [1.10]
Indeed, from the hypotheses and the resource constraint, it derives 2kt+1 = Rh (2st)⇒
kt+1 = Rhst. The thesis follows immediately substituting the optimized values.
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Proposition 1.8.
The relation [1.10] has a unique solution kt+1 = ψ (kt,Rh).
Effectively the relation [1.10] is formally identical to the [1.7].
Proposition 1.9.
The capital values kt+1 and kt of [1.10] satisfy the following relations:
kt+1 ∈ (0, Rh2 ] and kt ∈ (0, kA], where kA = W−1
 1
2S
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)).8
Proposition 1.10. The interest factor rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1) is a decreasing, continu-
ous function of kt, defined into the interval (0, kA].
Its minimum value is Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
1.2.2.2. The case rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1) and 0 < γ < 1
In these hypotheses, each country will produce capital goods.
Agents in a-Country will be indifferent to become lenders or entrepreneurs, while
agents in h-Country will strictly prefer to start an investment project and enjoy, at
maximum degree, the differential between the return of capital Rhf
′ (kt+1) and the
cost of borrowing rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1).
The resource constraint is 2kt+1 = (1)Rh+
(
sht + sat − 1
)
Ra and the law of formation
of second period capital stock will be obtained substituting the optimal values of
savings sˆht and sˆat .
Second period consumption for agents in the home and in the foreign Country
respectively, will be:
ch2t+1 =(1 )Rhf
′ (kt+1 )−
(
1 − sht
)
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
and
ca2t+1 = satRaf
′ (kt+1).9
8See Appendix to Chapter 1.
9Note that cˆh2t+1 + cˆa2t+1 =
[
Rh +Ra
(
sˆht + sˆat − 1
)]
f
′ (kt+1) and, from resource constraint, it
follows cˆh2t+1 + cˆa2t+1 = 2kt+1f
′ (kt+1). That’s correct, because cˆh2t+1 + cˆa2t+1 is also the share
of second period production, that pays the capital factors.
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At this point, young agents will choose the level of savings, in order to maximize
their utility, over the two periods.
Thus:
sˆht : maxU
(
ch1t ; ch2t+1
)
i.e. maxU
(
W (kt)− sht ; Rhf ′ (kt+1)−
(
1− sht
)
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
.
sˆat : max U
(
ca1t ; ca2t+1
)
i.e. max U
(
W (kt)− sat ; satRaf ′ (kt+1)
)
.
Considering again the utility function U (c1 ; c2) = c
1−γ
1 −1
1−γ + β
c1−γ2 −1
1−γ , we can derive
the optimal values for savings, in h and in a-Country.
Finally we will be able to obtain the law of formation of the new capital stock kt+1.
Proposition 1.11.
When rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1) and 0 < γ < 1, the optimal level of savings, respectively in
home and foreign Country are:
sˆht =
W(kt)β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ−1−
(
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
1+β
1
γ [Raf ′ (kt+1)]
1
γ−1
=
= W (kt) S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
−
(
1− S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)) (
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
[1.11]
sˆat =
β
1
γ W(kt)
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ−1
1+β
1
γ (Raf ′ (kt+1))
1
γ−1
= W (kt) S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
[1.12]
The law of motion of the economy is:
kt+1−
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
S(Raf ′ (kt+1)) =RaW(kt)
[1.13]
Proposition 1.12.
The solution of [1.13] is a continuous, increasing function of kt: kt+1 = φ (kt,Rh,Ra).
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Proposition 1.13.
Let kB = W−1
 Rh2 −(Rh−Ra2 )S(Raf ′(Rh2 ))
RaS
(
Raf ′
(
Rh
2
))  and kA = W−1
 1
2S
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)) from
proposition 1.9. Then, as always supposing Rh > Ra, it is kB > kA.
Proposition 1.14.
The interest factor rt+1 is a continuous, decreasing function of kt; its maximum
value, over the interval [kB;R) is Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
1.2.2.3. The case Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
< rt+1 < Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
and 0 < γ < 1
Under these hypotheses, capital goods are produced only in the home Country.
But now savings are payed less than their maximum productivity.
All agents in h-Country are entrepreneurs and their profitability constraint is valid,
with the sign “>”, while agents in the a-Country are all lenders. These last, strictly
prefer to borrow than to start an investment project, therefore their return is bigger.
Proposition 1.15.
Under the hypotheses, Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
< rt+1 < Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
and 0 < γ < 1 the law of
formation of new capital is:
kt+1 = Rh2 [1.14]
The thesis comes immediately reminding that sht +sat = 1 and that the production of
capital goods takes place only in the home Country, characterized by the parameter
of efficiency Rh.
Proposition 1.16.
Under the hypotheses, Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
< rt+1 < Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
and 0 < γ < 1, it follows:
sˆht =
W(kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1−Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
[1.15]
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sˆat =
W(kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
[1.16]
rt+1 (kt) =
 Rhf ′(Rh2 )
β
1
γ (2W(kt)−1)
γ [1.17]
1.2.2.4. Unifying the results, under the hypothesis 0 < γ < 1
Proposition 1.17.
The interest factor rt+1 is a continuous, decreasing function of kt, over the interval
(0;Rh).
Precisely, it is:
rt+1 (kt) =

Rhf
′ (ψ (kt, Rh)) if kt ≤ kA Rhf ′(Rh2 )
β
1
γ (2W (kt)−1)
γ if kA < kt < kB
Raf
′ (φ (kt, Rh, Ra)) if kt ≥ kB
[1.18]
Proposition 1.18.
The law of motion of capital is a continuous, not decreasing function, whose expres-
sion is:
G (kt,Rh,Ra) =

ψ (kt, Rh) if kt ≤ kA
Rh
2 if kA < kt < kB
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) if kt ≥ kB
[1.19]
This result comes from the previous relation [1.14] and propositions 1.8, 1.12.
G (kt, Rh, Ra) is a function with “three branches”, the first and the third are increas-
ing, the medium is flat.
About this last, it must be noted that new capital remains constant, while the cost
of investments decreases from higher value Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
, to the lower Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
The first is the minimum return of investments, when production of capital goods is
concentrated only in h-Country. The second is the maximum value when production
is made in each country.
During the time in which rt+1 stays from these two values, aggregate savings remain
equal to one, but the cost of the investments decreases continuously, until it reaches
the lower value. At this point, production of capital goods starts also in a-Country.
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1.2.3. Results under the hypothesis γ = 1
In this case interest factor doesn’t bind savings decision, because savings are always
the same, in each country: sht = sat = st =
(
β
1+β
)
W (kt).
Proposition 1.19.
If kt ≤ kA = W−1
(
1+β
2β
)
then the aggregate savings are equal, or less than 1;
production of capital goods occurs only in home Country and interest factor is
rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1).
The law of formation of new capital is:
kt+1 = ψ (kt,Rh) =
(
β
1+β
)
RhW (kt) [1.20]
Proposition 1.20.
If kt > kA = W−1
(
1+β
2β
)
then the aggregate savings are greater than 1; production of
capital goods takes place in each country and interest factor is rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1).
The law of formation of new capital is:
kt+1 = φ (kt,Rh,Ra) = Rh−Ra2 +
(
β
1+β
)
RaW (kt) [1.21]
The proof of this proposition comes naturally from the opposite of the previous
proposition 1.19.
Particularly, kt > kA involves st > 12 then, the home Country cannot run out all
the supply of savings. Consequently, production of capital goods takes place in each
country.
Interest factor must be rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1), because of the minor efficiency of the
foreign Country. Agents in the home Country will strictly prefer to borrow, while
agents in the foreign Country will be indifferently lenders, or borrowers.
In this case, 2kt+1 = (1)Rh+(2st − 1)Ra. Substituting st =
(
β
1+β
)
W (kt) we obtain
the relation [1.21].
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Remark. It’s immediate to observe that:
lim
kt→k−A
ψ (kt, Rh) = lim
kt→k+A
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) = Rh2
This result assures the continuity of the function of new capital formation, as we
will see in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.21.
When the parameter γ is equal to 1, the following consequences occur:
− The interest factor is a continuous, decreasing function of kt:
rt+1 (kt) =
Rhf
′ (ψ (kt, Rh)) if kt ≤ kA
Raf
′ (φ (kt, Rh, Ra)) if kt > kA
[1.22]
− The law of the new capital formation is a continuous, increasing function of kt:
G (kt,Rh,Ra) =
ψ (kt, Rh) =
(
β
1+β
)
RhW (kt) if kt ≤ kA
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) = Rh−Ra2 +
(
β
1+β
)
RaW (kt) if kt > kA
[1.23]
These assertions directly follow from propositions 1.19 and 1.20.
Particularly, comparing the relation [1.22] with the [1.18] and [1.23] with [1.19], we
can see the case γ = 1 as a limit one of 0 < γ < 1.
In this case the law of motion has not “flat branches” and, consequently, there is no
longer an interval of values for kt, by which the interest factor is decreasing, but the
total amount of savings remains equal to 1.
Only a particular value of kt may cause a total unitary supply of savings. A greater
value of kt immediately expands the production of capital goods also in the foreign
Country.
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1.3. Numerical examples
Now it will be considered the last case concerning two countries with no economic
barriers, with same specific hypotheses about the production function and parame-
ters. At first, we derive some useful outcomes, when the production function is of
Cobb-Douglas type.
1.3.1. The case of Cobb-Douglas production function
Let f (kt) = Akαt , with 0 < α < 1.
Proposition 1.22.
When f (kt) = Akαt , all properties from i0 to i9 are satisfied.
Proposition 1.23.
The relations [1.19] and [1.23] respectively become:
G (kt,Rh,Ra)
(0<γ<1 )
:

k
γ+(1−α)(1−γ)
γ
t+1 + (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
h kt+1 = (1− α) (α)
1−γ
γ R
1
γ
hA
1
γ β
1
γ kαt if kt ≤ kA
Rh
2 if kA < kt < kB
k
γ+(1−α)(1−γ)
γ
t+1 + (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
a kt+1 = (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
a
(
Rh−Ra
2 + (1− α)ARakαt
)
if kt ≥ kB
[1.24]
G (kt,Rh,Ra)
(γ=1 )
:
kt+1 =
(
β
1+β
)
(1− α)ARhkαt if kt ≤ kA
kt+1 = Rh−Ra2 +
(
β
1+β
)
(1− α)ARakαt if kt > kA
[1.25]
Later on, it will be considered a particular choice of parameters, in order to solve
analytically the law of motion.
At first we are going to set α = 13 and γ = 1, then we will see what happens when
α = 13 and γ =
2
5 .
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1.3.2. A particular choice of parameters: α = 13, γ = 1
From [1.25], being kA =
[
3(1+β)
4Aβ
]3
, we have:
G (kt,Rh,Ra) :
kt+1 =
2
3ARh
(
β
1+β
)
k
1
3
t if kt ≤
(
3(1+β)
4Aβ
)3
kt+1 = Rh−Ra2 +
2
3ARa
(
β
1+β
)
k
1
3
t if kt >
(
3(1+β)
4Aβ
)3 [1.26]
Now we are going to study the process of convergence for G (kt,Rh, Ra).
Proposition 1.24.
If Rh2 ≤ kA, then the first branch of G (kt,Rh, Ra) converges to a stable, fixed point
0 < k∗ψ ≤ kA and economy reaches its steady state, when production of capital goods
is concentrated in the home Country.
On the contrary, if Rh2 > kA, the second branch converges to a stable point k
∗
φ > kA
and the production of capital goods expands over the two countries.
Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2
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1.3.3. Another choice of parameters: the case α = 13, γ =
2
5
With this choice of parameters, particularly with 0 < γ < 1, the map G (kt,Rh, Ra)
comes from the relation [1.24] and has three branches, the first and the third one
increasing, the medium flat.
In order to simplify the expressions, let’s set Vj = 23ARj ; Cj = β
5
2
(
ARj
3
) 3
2 ;
H = Rh−Ra2 .
In this way, we can introduce the following proposition.
Proposition 1.25.
Under the hypotheses α = 13 and γ =
2
5 , the law of motion is:
G (kt,Rh,Ra) =

ψ (kt, Rh) = 12
√
C2h + 4VhChk
1
3
t − 12Ch if kt ≤ kA
Rh
2 if kA < kt < kB
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) = 12
√
C2a + 4HCa + 4VaCak
1
3
t − 12Ca if kt ≥ kB
[1.27]
where kA: ψ (kA, Rh) = Rh2 and kB: φ (kB, Rh, Ra) =
Rh
2 are:
kA =
(
R2h+2ChRh
4VhCh
)3
[1.28]
kB =
(
R2h+2CaRh−4HCa
4VaCa
)3
=
(
R2h+2CaRa
4VaCa
)3
[1.29]
Remark: as for most of the previous propositions, the proof can be found in the
Appendix to Chapter 1.
29
1.3 Numerical examples
Proposition 1.26.
The function G (kt,Rh, Ra) [1.27] has three branches; the first one is increasing and
connects (0; 0) to
(
kA; R2
)
; the second one is flat and stands between
(
kA; R2
)
and(
kB; R2
)
; finally the third one is increasing and starts in
(
kB; R2
)
.
Whenever a feasible steady state exists along a given branch, then it is asymptotically
stable, and no other steady states exist on other branches. Moreover, at least a branch
must converge. Therefore, G (kt,Rh, Ra) has always a unique point of steady state.
Three are the main situations:
− if Rh2 ≤ kA then the fixed point of G (kt,Rh, Ra) is k∗ψ ≤ Rh2 . Production of capital
goods occurs only in the home Country; interest factor will be rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1);
− if kA < Rh2 < kB the fixed point of G (kt,Rh, Ra) is k∗∗ = Rh2 . Only agents in
the home Country start investment projects, while all agents in the foreign Country
are lenders. The interest factor is Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
< rt+1 < Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
and the aggregate
savings are 1;
− if kB ≤ Rh2 the fixed point of G (kt,Rh, Ra) is k∗φ ≥ Rh2 . Production of capital goods
is carried out in each country and the interest factor is rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1), while
aggregate savings become bigger than 1.
Fig. 1.3 Fig. 1.4 Fig. 1.5
In order to prove the assertions above, as usual, let’s consider each branch of the
curve G (kt,Rh, Ra).
The “branch” ψ (kt, Rh). It is easy to verify that the expression ψ (kt, Rh),
for kt ≥ 0, is an increasing curve, with declining slope and therefore downwardly
concave.
In order to prove that, let’s determine its first and second derivatives.
∂ψ(kt,Rh)
∂kt
= VhCh
3
(
C2
h
+4VhChk
1
3
t
) 12
k
2
3
t
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∂2ψ(kt,Rh)
∂k2t
= −
2VhC2h
(
5Vhk
1
3
t +Ch
)
9
(
C2
h
+4VhChk
1
3
t
) 32
k
5
3
t
Thus ∂ψ(kt,Rh)
∂kt
> 0, lim
kt→0+
∂ψ(kt,Rh)
∂kt
= +∞, lim
kt→+∞
∂ψ(kt,Rh)
∂kt
= 0 ; while ∂2ψ(kt,Rh)
∂k2t
< 0.
Considering that ψ (0, Rh) = 0, it follows that ψ (kt, Rh) is tangent, on the origin, to
the ordinate axis; then the curve rises continuously, but every time more slowly and
tends to become flat. Summarizing, the equation ψ (kt, Rh) = kt has a unique, not
trivially, solution, over the interval (0; +∞). If the solution falls into the interval
(0; kA], then it is a valid steady state for G (kt,Rh, Rf ); as usual, we’ll indicate it as
k∗ψ.
The curve ψ (kt, Rh) passes through the point A
(
kA,
Rh
2
)
. Then k∗ψ > kA if A lies
over the bisector and k∗ψ < kA if A stays under the bisector. In conclusion the steady
state point k∗ψ exists if and only if kA ≥ Rh2 . Finally, because of the geometry of the
curve, if k∗ψ exists, it is necessary stable.
The value kA as function of Rh. Because of the previous outcomes, it is worth
to study the relation between kA and Rh, some more deeply.
From [1.28], being Vh = 23ARh and Ch = β
5
2
(
ARh
3
) 3
2 it is:
kA =
(
1+2β
5
2 (A3 )
3
2R
1
2
h
8β
5
2 (A3 )
5
2R
1
2
h
)3
.
For simplicity let’s set p = 2β 52
(
A
3
) 3
2 and q = 8β 52
(
A
3
) 5
2 , then
kA (Rh) =
(
1+pR
1
2
h
qR
1
2
h
)3
[1.30]
It is easy to verify that kA (Rh) is a continuous, decreasing function, over the interval
interval Rh > 0 and has two asymptotes, one vertical that is the ordinate axis, and
the other horizontal, the line k =
(
3
4A
)3
.
Indeed its first derivative is dkA
Rh
= −3
2qR
3
2
h
(
1+pR
1
2
h
qR
1
2
h
)2
< 0 ∀Rh > 0 and
lim
Rh→0+
kA (Rh) = +∞ , while lim
Rh→+∞
kA (Rh) =
(
p
q
)3
=
(
3
4A
)3
Finally, let us consider the intersection E
(
REh ; kE
)
between kA (Rh) and the line
k = Rh2 .
The coordinate REh it’s hard to find through algebraical way, but can be determined
by numerical methods.
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If we accept an approximation of 2 decimal points, under the hypothesis A = 1 and
β = 0.9, we obtain REh = 8, 50.
For our purposes, the main fact is that, when Rh ≤ REh , then kA (Rh) ≥ Rh2 and the
steady point k∗ψ = ψ
(
k∗ψ;Rh
)
exists.
On the contrary, when Rh > REh (Rh is too big), the branch ψ (kt;Rh) ends before
reaching its steady point and k∗ψ is virtual.
Fig. 1.6 Fig. 1.7 Fig. 1.8 Fig. 1.9
The “branch” φ (kt, Rh, Ra).
We will see that φ (kt, Rh, Ra) is, mathematically speaking, quite similar to ψ (kt, Rh),
in the semi-plane kt ≥ 0.
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) is a continuous function, tangent to the ordinate axis on (0;φ0 > 0),
increasing, but with declining slope, as kt becomes bigger, thus downwardly concave.
Indeed:
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= VaCa
3
(
C2a+4HCa+4VaCak
1
3
t
) 12
k
2
3
t
∂2φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂k2t
= −
2VaC2a
(
5Vak
1
3
t +Ca+4H
)
9
(
C2a+4HCa+4VaCak
1
3
t
) 32
k
5
3
t
Then
φ (0, Rh, Ra) > 0;
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
> 0, lim
kt→0+
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= +∞, lim
kt→+∞
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= 0;
∂2φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂k2t
< 0.
In conclusion, equation φ (kt, Rh, Ra) = kt has a unique solution, over the interval
(0; +∞). If such a solution belongs to [kB; +∞), then it is a point of steady state
k∗φ, for G (kt,Rh, Ra).
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Considering that φ (kB, Rh, Ra) = Rh2 , even in this case, the relation between kB
and Rh2 determines whether k
∗
φ is a valid steady point, or is virtual. Let’s assume
B
(
kB,
Rh
2
)
the point at the beginning of the curve.
If B is over or, at limit, on the bisector, then k∗φ ∈ [kB; +∞). On the other hand, if
B is under the bisector, then k∗φ ∈ (0, kB). In conclusion, k∗φ exists, if and only if, it
is kB ≤ Rh2 .
Remembering that, for a given Rh > Ra, it is kB > kA, it follows that, if kA ≥ Rh2 ,
then kB > Rh2 and k
∗
φ is virtual.10
On the contrary, if kA < Rh2 , then kB may be or may not be less than
Rh
2 ; it depends
on Ra. Only if kB ≤ Rh2 , then k∗φ is real.
Hence we will study the relation between kB and Ra.
From [1.29] it is kB (Ra) =
(
R2h
4VaCa +
3
4A
)3
=
(
R2h
8(A3 )
5
2 β
5
2R
5
2
a
+ 34A
)3
.
Therefore, setting m = R
2
h
8(A3 )
5
2 β
5
2
and n = 34A :
kB (Ra) =
(
m
R
5
2a
+ n
)3
[1.31]
kB (Ra) is a continuous, decreasing function of Ra , in the semi-plane Ra > 0.
The curve has a vertical asymptote corresponding to the ordinate axis and an hori-
zontal asymptote that is k =
(
3
4A
)3
.
Indeed:
dkB(Ra)
dRa
= − 152 m
R
7
2
a
(
m
R
5
2
a
+ n
)2
< 0
lim
Ra→0+
kB (Ra) = +∞; lim
Ra→+∞
kB (Ra) =
(
3
4A
)3
Remark. From [1.28] and [1.29] the condition kA ≤ kB implies:
R2h (VaCa − VhCh) ≤ 2ChCa (VhRa − VaRh) = 0 ⇒
VaCa ≤ VhCh ⇔ Ra ≤ Rh.
Remembering the hypothesis Ra < Rh, we conclude that kA ≤ kB, while their limits
are equal:
lim
Rh→+∞
kA (Rh) = lim
Ra→+∞
kB (Ra).
10In such case, condition kA ≥ Rh2 implies that k∗ψ is real.
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Now, suppose it is kA < Rh2 , for a given Rh. Then the point k
∗
ψ is virtual.
If kB (Ra) ≤ Rh2 , then there exists the steady point k∗φ generated by φ (kt, Rh, Ra).
This happens when k−1B
(
Rh
2
)
≤ Ra < Rh.
For Ra < k−1B
(
Rh
2
)
instead, it’s kB > Rh2 and the steady point of the map is
Rh
2
generated by the horizontal line y = Rh2 .
Finally, we have to determine R˜a = k−1B
(
Rh
2
)
.
From Rh2 =
(
m
R˜a
5
2
+ n
)3
we obtain:
R˜a =
 R2h
8(A3 )
5
2 β
5
2
((
Rh
2
)1
3− 34A
)

2
5
[1.32]
Fig. 1.10
In fig. 1.10, is A = 1, β = 0.9, Rh = 12. Approximating at second decimal, R˜a is
10, 32 and kA almost 3, 26.
Into the colored zone, for R˜a < Ra < Rh, is kA < kB < Rh2 . The function
φ (kt, Rh, Ra) intersects the bisector in a steady point k∗φ for G (kt,Rh, Ra).
Differently, when Ra < R˜a, the curve φ (kt, Rh, Ra) doesn’t intersect the bisector in
a valid point. In that case, the steady point for G (kt,Rh, Ra) is Rh2 .
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1.4. Conclusions
The last figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 portrait essentially the main phenomenon described
in this first part of the thesis.
Depending on quantity of capital accumulation, the law of motion of new capital
goes on towards its steady state point and two situations may materialize: the one
described in figures 1 and 2, in which the production of capital goods occurs only in
the most productive country, the other described in figure 3, in which the production
of capital goods takes place in the two countries. In each case, the opening of markets
(of factors and loans) obviously assures that there will be the same interest rate in
each country, but not always is the return of investment equal to the cost of savings,
sometimes it is greater. Finally, despite different capacities on producing capital
goods, the law of motion doesn’t know any discontinuity point.
Now there are sufficient elements to give an answer to the main question, which we
began this work with.
What happens when economic barriers fall down and a country opens itself to foreign
exchanges?
In order to ease the explanation, let’s firstly suppose that the financial markets are
initially closed; then the two countries open their markets.
We can make a comparison between the two situations just described.
Supposing that there is different efficiency in producing capital goods, Rh > Ra, ini-
tially (when the frontiers are closed) there are two interest factors, rh = Rhf
′ (kt+1)
greater than ra = Raf
′ (kt+1), that reflect the heterogeneity of the countries. The
production of capital goods takes place in each country and savings are exactly paid
their marginal return; non arbitrage condition makes agents indifferent whether
becoming lenders or borrowers.
Let’s suppose that during the year t, when the two countries decide to open their
financial frontiers, it is W (kt) < 12 . In this way, whichever is the interest rate, there
are no doubts that aggregate savings sht + sat will be less than one.
During year t various changes will occur: production of capital goods will concen-
trate only in the home Country; interest factor will rise to Rhf
′ (kt+1) also in the
foreign Country; for h − agents will be indifferent whether to become depositors
or to start an investment project, while a− agents will strictly prefer to lend their
savings.
Depending on Rh, the law of motion of aggregate economy can reach its steady
point k∗ψ ≤ Rh2 , in its first “branch”ψ (kt, Rh). In that case, the new situation will
be “frozen” on its initial features.
If Rh is too big (if parameter A = 1, we know it does, when Rh > 8, 50), then the
steady point of ψ (kt, Rh) is virtual and system reaches its stability, depending on
the second parameter Ra.
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If Ra is not far from Rh, then the world economy converges at its steady point k∗φ,
on the third “branch” φ (kt, Rh, Ra).
This means that capital goods are produced in each country, the cost of savings
is Raf
′ (kt+1), but the return of investments is bigger, Rhf
′ (kt+1). It follows that,
agents in the home Country strictly prefer to start an investment project, differently
from agents in the foreign Country.
If differences between the two countries are bigger, i.e. if Ra is a lot lower than Rh,
the system converges to its “flat branch” Rh2 .
Production of capital goods is concentrated only in the home Country, but savings
are paid less than Rhf
′ (kt+1) (even if more than Raf
′ (kt+1)).
For agents in h-Country it is more convenient to become entrepreneurs, while agents
in a-Country strictly prefer to become lenders.
Concluding: for the two countries, consequences of opening their markets may de-
pend on their specific characteristics or on their relative characteristics.
If efficiency in producing capital goods is generally low, then there is no other option,
except obtaining capital factors from the more productive country. If efficiency
is generally high, producing will still remain on the two countries, even after the
opening of the frontiers.
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Part II.
A two-Country OLG model, with
credit market imperfections
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In the two following chapters, we will adopt a model proposed by Matsuyama
(Matsuyama [10]) and adapted to the two-country case by Kikuchi and Stachurski
(Kikuchi & Stachurski [8]). In order to do that, we will introduce some new hy-
potheses on the model presented in the first part.
The main change is a new axiom concerning credit market imperfection. We will
suppose that lenders are suspicious about borrowers and believe that they will not
repay their debts, if the cost of the obligation is greater than the cost of the default,
which is taken to be a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the project output. Therefore, agents take
the interest rate as given but, at the equilibrium rate, borrowers cannot obtain any
amount of credit they like. Consequently, this hypothesis introduces a “borrowing
constraint”, close to the usual profitability constraint.
We continue to consider an overlapping generations model, with a constant, nor-
malized population, consisting in old and young agents. Now we suppose that the
young don’t consume their wage, but supply it totally, in order to assure their fi-
nal consumption. In this way, their optimization choice consists only in whether
to become lenders, or entrepreneurs (borrowers). Again, in a more general way, we
suppose that the consistency of each generation will be a fraction 0 < L < 1.
The main results.
In Chapter two, after introduced the model, we will analyze the case of two perfectly
symmetric open economies, with integrated financial markets.
We will develop a global analysis, in the hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas production
function and, adopting the particular choice of setting the share of income paid to
capital as α = 12 , we will obtain a complete description of the economic environment.
Particularly we will prove the existence of multiple steady states and the presence of
a Milnor attractor. These outcomes allow to predict consequences of credit market
integration, for two countries identical in their economic features and, by extension
for two quite similar ones.
In Chapter three we will explore consequences due to heterogeneity of the two coun-
tries in their economic features, when they open their financial markets. Various
cases will be investigated: “quasi-symmetry”, supposing differences only in popu-
lation size; “complete heterogeneity” in population, technology and credit market
imperfection; “quasi-heterogeneity”, with equal populations, but differences in tech-
nology and credit market imperfection.
The first set of hypotheses will allow to obtain formal results which, in some cases, ex-
hibit analogies with the perfect symmetrical situation but, as in Kikuchi & Stachurski
([8]), via numerical simulation, it will also be possible to prove the existence of pe-
riodic phenomena.
Adopting the hypotheses of complete heterogeneity, we will argue that, periodic
phenomena are not due only by differences in population size (as in Kikuchi &
38
Stachurski), but also in technologies and credit market imperfections. We will an-
alyze deeply some periodic dynamics, involving cyclical phenomena and a crater
bifurcation. Finally showing the presence of a crater bifurcation also in the case of
“quasi-heterogeneity” (therefore with equal populations and different parameters of
technology and credit market imperfection) we will consider definitely proved our
thesis about differences in technology and credit market imperfection as cause of
periodic and quasi-periodic phenomena.
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2. Two open economies, with credit
market imperfections.
2.1. A new axiomatic picture. The model.
We consider an overlapping generations model, with two generations of old and
young, each one consisting of people having mass 0 < L < 1 and living for two
periods.
As considered before, there is only one type of goods suitable for every economic
dealing and two productive processes: the first, of capital goods, covering two peri-
ods; the second, of consumer goods, starting and ending in the same period.
Capital goods producing technology is again linear and requires a minimum invest-
ment, normalized to one:
G (z) =
0 if z ∈ [0, 1)RR+ if z ∈ [1,+∞)
The production of consumer goods is obtained by an intensive, per capita function
f (kt), with the same axiomatic features of Chapter 1, which takes in input the two
factors of labor and capital, and consume they entirely, at the end.
Young agents are endowed with one unit of labor and they inelastically supply it to
the competitive labor market. They receive an income wt and they invest it entirely,
in order to assure availability of goods during the older part of their life (the second
one), assumed to be the only season in which people consume.
The choice of the young agent. In this reformulation of the axiomatic picture,
people consume only in the second part of their life. So, after received his income,
the young agent has to decide whether to become a depositor, or an entrepreneur.
In the first case he lends his savings in the first period and will receive, in the later
one, c2t+1 = wtrt+1. He will entirely consume it and exit.
On the contrary, if the agent becomes an entrepreneur, he has to run a discrete,
indivisible project, that requires a minimum supply of one unit of starting invest-
ment, in period t and returns R units of capital factors in t+ 1. The latter may be
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supplied to the productive process of consumer goods and finally allows to obtain a
return of Rf ′ (kt+1) units of goods available for the last consumption.
We suppose that:
i2.1) R ∈
(
0, R(+)
)
, where R(+) : W
(
R(+)
)
= 1.
In this way, because of the properties of the production function f (.), supposing
kt ∈ (0, R), it will be W (kt) < W (R). This means that agents need to borrow, in
order to start their investment projects.
i2.2) Factors are not tradeable and agents cannot start an investment project
abroad.
i2.3) Each agent cannot start more than one investment project.
Comparing the two outcomes for lenders and borrowers, we can conclude that agents
are willing to become entrepreneurs, if and only if Rf ′ (kt+1)−(1− wt) rt+1 ≥ wtrt+1;
hence:
Rf ′ (kt+1) ≥ rt+1 profitability constraint [v1 ]
The credit market imperfection. Now we introduce a particular hypothesis, about
credit market imperfection. It consists in supposing that borrowers will not repay
their debts, if the cost of the obligation is bigger than the cost of the default.
The cost of the default is taken to be λ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the project output:
λRf
′ (kt+1).
In this way, agents take the interest rate as given (and in that sense the credit market
is freely competitive) but borrowers cannot obtain any amount of credit they like.
In fact an agent who needs an amount (1−W (kt)) of credit, is able to obtain it
only if (1−W (kt)) rt+1 ≤ λRf ′ (kt+1).
So the young entrepreneur can have the loan only if:
Rf ′ (kt+1) ≥ (1−W(kt))rt+1λ borrowing constraint [v2 ]
In conclusion the young agents will start their investment projects, when they are
willing to borrow (v1) and able to borrow (v2) .
Every time one of the two constraints is binding.
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The limit value k (λ). Let k (λ) be the capital value s.t. 1−W (k (λ)) = λ.
If kt < k (λ), then the borrowing constraint v2 is binding, because it is stronger than
v1.
If kt ≥ k (λ), the profitability constraint v1 is binding.
Let’s suppose λ = 1. Consequently W (k (1)) = 0 and agents are able to borrow
whatever they want. Then it must be k (1) = 0.
Then, suppose it is λ = 0. W (k (0)) = 1. Agents will never obtain credit. From i2.1
we know it is k (0) = R(+).
Differentiating relative to λ each side of 1−W (k (λ)) = λ, we obtain:
∂k(λ)
∂λ
= − 1
W ′ (k(λ)) < 0 because of the hypothesis f
′′ (kt) < 0. Thus k (λ) is a
decreasing function of λ.
Then, supposing 0 < λ < 1 it follows that 0 < k (λ) < R(+).
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2.2. Autarky.
Let’s assume initially that the financial markets are closed, so that there is no
international borrowing and lending and each country operates in autarky.
The law of motion. Being W (kt) the total per capita amount of savings existing
at time t, since savings must equalize investment, the rule by which new capital can
be obtained will be:
kt+1 = RW (kt) [2.1]
This equation completely describes the dynamics of capital formation.
The interest factor. In each time, one of the constraint v1 or v2 is binding, de-
pending whether it is kt ≥ k (λ) or not and we may assume them with the symbol
of ” = ”.
In each period, the interest rate will adjust, so that domestic investment will be
equal to domestic savings:
rt+1 =

λR
1−W (kt)f
′ (RW (kt)) if kt < k (λ)
Rf
′ (RW (kt)) if kt ≥ k (λ)
[2.2]
Remarks. The λ degree of imperfection of the financial market affects the interest
rate, but not the total amount of capital produced.
Proposition 2.1.
(0;R) is a forward invariant set for kt+1.
Indeed, supposing kt ∈ (0, R), from [2.1] and i2.1 it follows:
kt+1 = RW (kt) < RW (R) < R. So kt+1 ∈ (0, R).
Proposition 2.2.
In the long run, economy converges to a unique, steady state
k? = RW (k?) = K? (R) [2.3]
(See proposition 3.1 of Kikuchi & Stachurski [8]).
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2.3. Two open economies
Later on, we will assume the following hypotheses:
− The world economy is only made by two countries, indicated by “h” for “home”
and “a” for “abroad”.
− Populations are, respectively, 0 < Lh < 1 and 0 < La < 1; they are supposed to
be complementary, so Lh + La = 1.
− Markets factors are closed, and agents cannot start an investment project abroad.
− Financial markets are integrated.
Now, since savings can freely flow throughout the world, the law of formation of new
capital, in each country, is affected by the degree of imperfection of the financial
markets.
In the Country j (where j = h , a), according to which constraint is binding, the
new capital will be derived from v1 or v2.
Setting φ =
(
f
′)−1, it will be:
kjt+1 = ψj (kjt, rt+1) =
φ
(
rt+1
Rj
(1−W (kjt)
λj
))
if kjt < k (λj)
φ
(
rt+1
Rj
)
if kjt ≥ k (λj)
[2.4]
Remark. Remembering that f ′ (.) is a decreasing function, the relation [2.4] can
also be expressed as:
kjt+1 = ψj (kjt, rt+1) = min
{
φ
(
rt+1
Rj
(
1−W(kjt)
λj
))
, φ
(
rt+1
Rj
)}
[2.4b]
The interest factor must endogenously equate savings and world investment. This
brings the relation of closure:
Lh kht+1Rh + La
kat+1
Ra = LhW (kht) + LaW (kat) [2.5]
Now it is possible to substitute ψj (kjt, rt+1) into the [2.5], in order to derive the
interest factor as a function of the capital stocks:
rt+1 = Φ (kht,kat) [2.6]
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Finally, substituting the relation [2.6] into the [2.4], we obtain the law describing
the evolution of the world economy, under integrated financial markets. It is made
by a two-dimensional dynamical system:
M (kht,kat) :
kht+1 = ψh (kht,Φ (kht, kat)) = mh (kht, kat)kat+1 = ψa (kat,Φ (kht, kat)) = ma (kht, kat) [2.7]
2.3.1. Production functions from Cobb-Douglas family
Now we will assume that the productive function comes from the Cobb-Douglas
family.
For j = h , a it is:
i2.4) f (kjt) = Ajkαjt
Moreover, in order to reduce the number of the parameters, we introduce the fol-
lowing substitutions:
i2.5) for j = h , a: yjt = kjtRj and Γj = AjR
α
j
1
Remark. Applying the substitutions above, we obtain:
f (yjt) = Γjyαjt; Wj (yjt) = (1− α) Γjyαjt.
Again, Yj = K(λj)Rj =
(
1−λj
(1−α)AjRαj
) 1
α
=
( 1−λj
(1−α)Γj
) 1
α is the border value of constrained-
not constrained credit.
Particularly, from [2.3], the steady state of autarky in the j-Country is:
Y? (Rj) =
K?(Rj)
Rj = [(1− α) Γj]
1
1−α [2.8]
The law of motion. A piecewise continuous map.
Applying i2.4 and i2.5 from [2.4] to [2.7] we have:
M (yht,yat) :
yht+1 =
Fh(yht)
τ(yht,yat)
yat+1 = Fa(yat)τ(yht,yat)
[2.9]
1The variable yjt represents the amount of investment ijt−1 needed in period t − 1 to obtain
the capital kjt in period t. From now on, the law of motion of the economy will describe the
relations in terms of investment, not yet of capital.
Γj is a composed parameter, that joins the coefficient of technology Aj , with the one of
efficiency Rj . Hence it is possible to fix one parameter, say Rj , and vary solely the other one.
For example we can set Rh = Ra = 1 and assume Γj = Aj in quantitative terms. In this way,
the two countries may differ only relative to the efficiency in producing the consumer goods
and any other heterogeneity about the production of capital goods can be omitted.
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Where:
Fj (yjt) =

(
αΓjλj
1−Wj(yjt)
) 1
1−α if yjt < Yj
(αΓj)
1
1−α if yjt ≥ Yj
and τ (yht, yat) = LhFh(yht)+LaFa(yat)LhWh(yht)+LaWa(yat)
being Lh + La = 1.
Four regions. The map [2.9] can be decomposed in four pieces, each one defined
in a different region of the phase space Ω = (yht ≥ 0) ∩ (yat ≥ 0).
− Region h0a0. Each country is borrowing constrained; 0 ≤ yht < Yh
and 0 ≤ yat < Ya
− Region h0a1. The h-Country is borrowing constrained, the a-Country is not;
0 ≤ yht < Yh and Ya ≤ yat
− Region h1a0. The h-Country is not borrowing constrained, the a-Country is;
Yh ≤ yht and 0 ≤ yat < Ya
− Region h1a1. No country is borrowing constrained; Yh ≤ yht and Ya ≤ yat
M00 (yht,yat) :

yht+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
Lh
(
Γhλh
1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α+La
(
Γaλa
1−(1−α)Γayαat
) 1
1−α
( Γhλh1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α
yat+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
Lh
(
Γhλh
1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α+La
(
Γaλa
1−(1−α)Γayαat
) 1
1−α
 ( Γaλa1−(1−α)Γayαat)
1
1−α
[2.9 a]
M01 (yht,yat) :

yht+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
Lh
(
Γhλh
1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
( Γhλh1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α
yat+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
Lh
(
Γhλh
1−(1−α)Γhyαht
) 1
1−α+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
Γ 11−αa
[2.9 b]
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M10 (yht,yat) :

yht+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+La
(
Γaλa
1−(1−α)Γayαat
) 1
1−α
Γ 11−αh
yat+1 =
 (1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+La
(
Γaλa
1−(1−α)Γayαat
) 1
1−α
 ( Γaλa1−(1−α)Γayαat)
1
1−α
[2.9 c]
M11 (yht,yat) :

yht+1 =
[
(1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
]
Γ
1
1−α
h
yat+1 =
[
(1−α)(LhΓhyαht+LaΓayαat)
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
]
Γ
1
1−α
a
[2.9 d]
Fig. 2.1
Proposition 2.3.
The map [2.9] is continuous.
In order to prove the proposition, consider that Wj
(
Yj
)
= 1 − λj so the function
Fj (yjt) is continuous. This proves the continuity of the map M (yht, yat).
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2.4. The symmetric case with a generic α
Later on, we will consider the case of two identical countries.
First we will consider a generic value for the capital income share α of the Cobb-
Douglas production function.
In the second part, we will derive some outcomes under the particular hypothesis
α = 12 .
2.4.1. The symmetric case. Basic features.
The map. Let’s suppose the two countries are identical:
Lh = La = 12 ; Γh = Γa = Γ ; λh = λa = λ
The map [2.9] becomes M (yht,yat) :
yht+1 =
F (yht)
τ(yht,yat)
yat+1 = F (yat)τ(yht,yat)
[2.9 s]
Where:
F (yjt) =

(
αΓλ
1−W (yjt)
) 1
1−α if yjt < Y
(αΓ)
1
1−α if yjt ≥ Y
and τ (yht, yat) = F (yht)+F (yat)W (yht)+W (yat) ,
being W (yjt) = (1− α) Γyαjt and Y =
(
1−λ
(1−α)Γ
) 1
α
Invariant sets and attractors. We can prove that, in the case of symmetry, these
features emerge:
- the set of points
yht = yatyjt ≥ 0 is invariant for the map;
- attractors are symmetric regarding the bisector yht = yat.
Proposition 2.4.
The half-line (yht = yat) ∩ (yjt ≥ 0) is an invariant set of points.
Applying the condition yht = yat = yt to the map [2.9 s], we have:
τ (yt, yt) = F (yt)W (yt) hence, yht+1 = yat+1 = W (yt).
This proves that the image of a point on the bisector, lies on the bisector.
Moreover, a point (yt+1, yt+1) on the bisector has a pre-image (yt, yt) on the same
bisector, which is simply obtained by taking yt = W−1 (yt+1) and we are done.
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Proposition 2.5.
If a point Q1 (µ, ν) is a steady state for the map, then the symmetric point Q2 (ν, µ)
is a steady state too.
Moreover, their stable sets are symmetric relative to the bisector.
Preliminary it is to be noted that τ (yht, yat) = τ (yat, yht).
Moreover, being Q1 (µ, ν) a steady state, from [2.9 s] it must be µ = F (µ)τ(µ,ν) and
ν = F (ν)
τ(µ,ν) .
Considering the image of the point Q2 (ν, µ), we obtain:
yht+1 (Q2) = F (ν)τ(ν,µ) =
F (ν)
τ(µ,ν) = ν and yat+1 (Q2) =
F (µ)
τ(ν,µ) =
F (µ)
τ(µ,ν) = µ.
That proves the first part of the thesis.
Now, let’s suppose that Q1 (µ, ν) and Q2 (ν, µ) are two, symmetric stable points.
Let A1 (µ0, ν0) be a point belonging to the stable set of Q1.
Then it will be limn→∞ (µn, νn) = Q1, where
(µn, νn) = M (µn−1, νn−1) =
(
F (µn−1)
τ(µn−1,νn−1) ,
F (νn−1)
τ(µn−1,νn−1)
)
, for n ≥ 1.
Again invoking the “parity” of τ (., .) , it is immediate to notice that a chain starting
from the symmetric point A2 (ν0, µ0), ends in Q2.
Indeed, νn = F (νn−1)τ(νn−1,µn−1) =
F (νn−1)
τ(µn−1,νn−1) and µn =
F (µn−1)
τ(νn−1,µn−1) =
F (µn−1)
τ(µn−1,νn−1) .
So (νn, µn) = M (νn−1, µn−1). Then limn→∞ (νn, µn) = Q2 q.e.d.
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2.4.2. The steady state of autarky P? in the symmetric case: a
Milnor attractor.
Let’s consider the point P?
(
[(1− α) Γ] 11−α , [(1− α) Γ] 11−α
)
lying on the bisector
yht = yat and belonging to the region h1a1, or h0a0, depending whether is
Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α or not.
We will see that P ? is a steady state of the system [2.9 s]. It is to be noted that
when the two countries lie in P ?, they are in the same equilibrium as in autarky.
For this reason we call P ? the steady state of autarky.2
According to the values of parameters, we will see some general outcomes in the
next proposition. For brevity we set p = [(1− α) Γ] 11−α .
Proposition 2.6.
Depending whether is Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α or not, the steady state of autarky P ? lies on the
region h1a1, or h0a0.
Into the region h1a1 P ? is a stable node, while, into h0a0, it may be a stable node
or a saddle point. In each case, its stable set includes, as minimum configuration of
points, the set
]
O, Y
[
∪ h1a1, that is the region h1a1 plus the segment of bisector]
O, Y
[
=
{
(yht, yat) : yht = yat and 0 < yjt < Y
}
. For this reason we assert that
P ? is a Milnor attractor.
Depending on the parameters of the system, we can have the following situations:
If α > λ then:
Γ = 1(1−α)α and Γ =
(1−λ)1−α
1−α are bifurcation values.
− For Γ < 1(1−α)α the point P ? stays into the region h0f0 and is a stable node.
− For 1(1−α)α < Γ < (1−λ)
1−α
1−α the point P
? remains into h0f0, but becomes a saddle
point.
− For Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? enters the region h1f1 and becomes a stable node.
If α ≤ λ:
− For Γ < (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? stays into the region h0f0 and is a stable node.
− For Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? enters the region h1f1 and remains a stable node.
2Of course this is a misuse of language, because the two economies are not in autarky, but their
equilibrium is the same as in autarky.
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The pictures in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 summarize the results.
For this and the following propositions, when the proof doesn’t follow immediately,
it can be found in the Appendix to Chapter 2.
Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3
Remark. We have seen that, even when P ? is a saddle point (of the region h0a0)
its stable set includes, as minimum configuration, the set of points
]
O, Y
[
∪h1a1 and
therefore has a positive Lebesgue measure. This means that P ? can be considered
as a Milnor attractor. This notion has been introduced by Milnor [13] to underline,
in general terms, the possible existence of an invariant set that can attract many
points, even if it is not an attractor in the usual sense.
An economic intuition, behind this result, is that the financial globalization can
destabilize the autarky steady state, however, there still exists a set of initial condi-
tions into the regions h0a1, h1a1, h1a0, whose trajectories will continue to converge
towards P ?. In other words, imperfection in the credit market can imply symmetry
breaking to occur, but this result largely depends on the initial conditions of the
world economy during the time of the financial globalization.
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2.5. The symmetric case with α = 12
We consider now a particular choice of the Cobb-Douglas production function and
we look for the fixed points in each of the four regions: we set to α = 12 the share of
income paid to capital.
The map [2.9 s] can be re-written considering its components in this particular case:
F (yjt) =

1
4 Γ
2λ2
(1− 12 Γ√yjt)
2 if yjt < Y
1
4Γ
2 if yjt ≥ Y
being Y = 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
while τ (yht, yat) = 2Γ
(
F (yht)+F (yat)√
yht+
√
yat
)
.
Firstly, we will see the number and the nature of the fixed points of the regions h1a1
and h0a0.
Then we will extend the analysis to the remaining regions.
2.5.1. The fixed points of the regions h1a1 and h0a0
The region h1a1 can only contain the steady state of autarky P?
(
Γ2
4 ,
Γ2
4
)
(stable
node).
The region h0a0 may contain P?
(
Γ2
4 ,
Γ2
4
)
and other two symmetric steady states:
Q1
( 1
2Γ
2+2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2 ,
1
2Γ
2−2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2
)
; Q2
( 1
2Γ
2−2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2 ,
1
2Γ
2+2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2
)
.
While P? in h0a0 may be a saddle point or a stable node, the points Q1 and Q2 are
always stable and may be nodes or foci.
To be more precise we will prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.7.
For λ ≥ 12 only the fixed point P ?exists. It is an attractive node and it belongs to
h1a1 when Γ ≥ 2
√
1− λ and to h0a0 in the opposite case.
For λ < 12 then the parameter Γ determines if there are one or three fixed points;
definitely:
− if Γ > 2√1− λ the point P ? belongs to h1a1and no fixed points exist in h0a0;
− if 2√2λ2 − 2λ+ 1 < Γ < 2√1− λ the point P ? is again the unique fixed point
into the two regions we are considering, but it is a saddle point and it stays in h0a0.
Its stable set has positive measure and includes the set
]
O, Y
[
∪ h1a1;
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− if 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
< Γ < 2
√
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1 there are three fixed points in h0a0: P ?,
Q1 and Q2, while there are no stable points in h1a1; P ? is a saddle point, Q1 and
Q2 are stable foci;
− if √2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
then P ?, Q1 and Q2 are in h0a0, while h1a1 has no
fixed points; P ? is a saddle point, Q1 and Q2 are stable nodes;
− if Γ < √2 there is the only stable node P ? in h0a0 and no steady points in h1a1.
Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5
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2.5.2. The fixed points of the regions h0a1 and h1a0
In each of the regions h0a1 and h1a0 there may symmetrically be two/one/none fixed
points.
We will prove some analytical conditions.
The figures 2.6 and 2.8 are drawn in the plane (λ,Γ2). The figures 2.7 and 2.9 are
the graphical representation of the conditions of steady stateM (yht, yat) = (yht, yat)
for some particular choices of the parameters; their aim is merely an explanatory
one.
Proposition 2.8.
One steady state exists in each region h0a1, h1a0, when:

Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 < 4 (1− λ)
0 < λ < 12
Fig. 2.6 Fig. 2.7
Two steady states exist in each region h0a1, h1a0, when:

Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 > 83
Γ2 > 4 (1− λ)
0 < λ ≤ λT (Γ) < 12
Fig. 2.8 Fig. 2.9
Since in this case, an explicit expression of the fixed points couldn’t be obtained, we
will try to derive them from a numerical simulation.
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2.6. A numerical simulation
Later on we will view a numerical simulation obtained by fixing λ and decreasing Γ.
The other parameters will be α = 12 and Lh = La =
1
2 . We will find all the outcomes
previously described.
The figures that follow are of two types. The colored ones represent the basins of
attraction of the stable points; different colors identify different basins. The others
complete the description of the dynamics and represent the conditions of steady
state M (yht, yat) = (yht, yat).
Fig. 2.10 Fig. 2.11 Fig. 2.12
Γ = 2.1 ; λ = 0.20 Γ = 2.0 ; λ = 0.20 Γ = 1.788854381999832 ; λ = 0.20
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Fig. 2.13 Fig. 2.14 Fig. 2.15
Γ = 1.7 ; λ = 0.20 Γ = 1.6 ; λ = 0.20 Γ = 1.44 ; λ = 0.20
Fig. 2.16
Γ = 1.40 ; λ = 0.20
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At the beginning (Fig. 2.10) the unique stable point is the asymptotically attractive
node P ? of the region h1a1 (the stable state of autarky).
Diminishing the parameter Γ, a pair of steady points appear in h0a1 and, symmet-
rically, in h1a0 (Fig. 2.11). Precisely, they are stable nodes and saddles. The stable
sets of the saddles separate the basins of attraction of the three coexisting stable
nodes.
Decreasing Γ, the node P ? tends towards the bifurcation point
(
Y , Y
)
and the same
thing do the two saddle points S1 and S2. At the border collision bifurcation (BCB)
these three steady points merge (Fig. 2.12). Therefore the BCB if of pitchfork type.
Continuing in diminishing Γ, the steady state of autarky P ? enters the region h0a0
and becomes a saddle, but its stable set has always positive measure and its frontier
is given by the preimages of any rank of the two constraints yh = Y and ya = Y
(Fig. 2.13).
In the same time, the two stable points of h0a1 and h1a0 move towards the lines
separating the regions, until they enter h0a0 too. Initially they are foci, then nodes,
approaching more and more P ? (Fig. 2.14 and 2.15). Finally they merge to P ? that
becomes a node and remains the unique steady state of the map, because of the
occurrence of the pitchfork bifurcation (Fig. 2.16).
Bifurcations. Summarizing, these are the bifurcation dynamics:
− A border collision bifurcation of subcritical pitchfork type, that occurs when P ?
is crossing from h1a1 to h0a0 and merges with the saddle points Sj.
− A supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, when the two nodes Qj merge with the
saddle P ? into the region h0a0.
− Two symmetrical saddle-node bifurcations into the regions h1a0 and h0a1, when
two steady points, respectively a node Qj and a saddle Sj, appear in each region.
− Two symmetrical border collision bifurcations, when the the points Qj enter the
region h0a0.
See figure 2.17 that summarizes the results.
Fig. 2.17
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2.7. Conclusions
This chapter has been concentrated essentially on the consequences of credit market
integration, between two countries, assuming that the other markets are closed. In
this way the aim of the work is to picture some possible scenarios due to financial
globalization.
After having introduced the model and derived the main formal implications, the
last part of the Chapter has been dedicated to a general description of financial
integration, in case of perfect identity between the two countries.
In order to make a comparison between the situation before and after the credit
market integration, great importance has been given to the steady state of autarky
P ? that marks a situation in which the two countries, after their financial integration,
lie in the same condition as before.
Even though referred to a particular parameter choice, the description made for the
case α = 12 can be useful to understand the dynamics in general terms.
Observing the figure 2.17, we can see that P ? may change its nature, from stable to
unstable, but the most relevant result is that, even when P ? is a saddle, its stable
set has positive measure (see, for example, Fig. 2.13) and it includes, at least, the
entire not borrowing constrained region h1a1. Again we can observe that P ? may
coexist with other steady states (up to four and two of them).
All these facts have great consequences about the opportunity for the countries to
join their financial markets.
Let’s suppose, for instance, that the steady state P ? is very closed to the border
point
(
Y , Y
)
and, before the financial integration, the two countries lie in a point
A of the neighborhood of P ?. If A is situated into the stable set of P ?(for example
all the region yjt > Y ) integration doesn’t really matter in the long run, because
the two countries will eventually go to P ?. On the contrary, if A lies in the basin of
attraction of some Q2j (see Fig. 2.13) through time, integration will be convenient
for one country, but harmful for the other.
In conclusion, it is to be noticed that, until perfect symmetry between the two
countries persists, no endogenous periodic dynamics may be found. These last will
be studied in the next Chapter, under a new set of hypotheses.
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3. Credit market imperfections. The
cases of “quasi-symmetry”,
“heterogeneity” and
“quasi-heterogeneity”.
In this last chapter, we continue the analysis begun in the second one and we gradu-
ally introduce heterogeneity between the two countries. As declared in the previous
parts of the work, our aim is to demonstrate that endogenous fluctuations may occur
not only because of differences in the population size, as in Kikuchi and Stachurski
([8]), but also due to heterogeneity in other economic features like technology and
credit market imperfection. Hence we start with the case of “quasi-symmetry”, sup-
posing the two countries to be identical in all their characteristic parameters, except
in the size of their populations. Firstly we study the consequences for the steady
state of autarky and we depict a global analysis, via a numerical simulation. Then,
like Kikuchi and Stachurski, we prove the existence of periodic dynamics, in this
case consisting in a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of supercritical type. Continuing
our exploration, we assume the hypotheses of total heterogeneity in populations,
technologies, and credit market imperfections. We deeply analyze some periodic
phenomena and depict the evolution of a crater bifurcation. Finally we consider
the case of “quasi-heterogeneity”, assuming that countries are different in all their
features, except for the size of their populations, these last supposed to be equal.
The occurrence of a crater bifurcation even in this case, prove definitely our thesis,
that the causes of periodic dynamics can be found in different magnitudes not only
of population, but also of technology and credit market imperfection.
The hypotheses considered will be the same as in the previous chapter:
− There are only two countries, “h” for “home” and “a” for “abroad”.
− Their populations 0 < Lh < 1 and 0 < La < 1 are supposed to be complementary:
Lh + La = 1.
− Markets factors are closed, and agents cannot start an investment project abroad.
− Financial markets are integrated, but imperfect.
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3.1. The case of “quasi-symmetry”.
We will suppose that the two countries are identical in all their specific features, but
their populations are different:
Lh 6= La ; Γh = Γa = Γ, λh = λa = λ.
The map. Under these assumptions the system map becomes:
M (yht,yat) :
yht+1 =
F (yht)
τ(yht,yat)
yat+1 = F (yat)τ(yht,yat)
Where:
F (yjt) =

(
αΓλ
1−W (yjt)
) 1
1−α if yjt < Y
(αΓ)
1
1−α if yjt ≥ Y
and τ (yht, yat) = LhF (yht)+LaF (yat)LhW (yht)+LaW (yat)
being Lh + La = 1 , W (yjt) = (1− α) Γyαjt , Y =
(
1−λ
(1−α)Γ
) 1
α
The main results. We will see that the half-line corresponding to the positive
segment of the bisector still remain an invariant set and the features relative to the
steady state of autarky P ? are preserved.
But now different attractors are not symmetric.
Proposition 3.1.
The half-line (yht = yat) ∩ (yjt ≥ 0) is an invariant set of points.
Indeed, applying the condition yht = yat = yt, we obtain the same outcomes as in
case of perfect symmetry:
τ (yht, yat) = F (yt)W (yt) hence yht+1 = yat+1 = W (yt).
Again yt = W−1 (yt+1) is a pre-image of yt+1, then each point (yt+1, yt+1) has almost
a pre-image (yt, yt) on the bisector.
The steady state of autarky P?
(
[(1− α) Γ] 11−α , [(1− α) Γ] 11−α
)
behaves in the same
way as in the case of perfect symmetry (see the proposition 2.6 of Chapter 2).
Indeed P ? belongs to the bisector yat = yht and there the map is not affected by the
parameters Lj. About the basin of attraction of P ?, it is to be noted that the points
of the region h1a1 reach the bisector just at the first iteration (as in symmetry) and,
by this way, they tend to the point P ?.
We summarize these features in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.2.
For Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α the steady state of autarky P ? is an asymptotically stable node of
the region h1a1.
For Γ < (1−λ)
1−α
1−α the steady state of autarky P
? lies into the region h0a0, where it
may be an attractive node, or a saddle point.
Even if it is a saddle, its stable set has positive measure. It certainly includes all
the points of the region h1a1, plus the segment of bisector
]
O, Y
[
:]
O, Y
[
=
{
(yht, yat) : yht = yat and 0 < yjt < Y
}
.
The following configuration of parameters exists:
If α > λ then:
Γ = 1(1−α)α and Γ =
(1−λ)1−α
1−α are bifurcation values.
− For Γ < 1(1−α)α the point P ? stays into the region h0f0 and is a stable node.
− For 1(1−α)α < Γ < (1−λ)
1−α
1−α the point P
? remains into h0f0, but becomes a saddle
point.
− For Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? enters the region h1f1 and becomes a stable node.
If α ≤ λ:
− For Γ < (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? stays into the region h0f0 and is a stable node.
− For Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α the point P ? enters the region h1f1 and remains a stable node.
(See the figures that follow for a synthetic summary)
Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2
Finally, out of the bisector, attractors are no longer symmetric, as we can easy see
in the following numerical simulations.
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Later on we will propose some numerical simulations. The figures that follow in
all this chapter are essentially of two types (the same types already appeared in
the previous chapter). The colored ones represent the basins of attraction of the
stable points (different colors identify different basins), while the other ones are the
graphical representation of the conditions of steady state M (yht, yat) = (yht, yat).
3.1.1. A first set of numerical simulations
Let’s suppose α = 13 , Lh = 0.25 for the h-Country and La = 0.75 for the a-Country.
To assume α = 13 means that the share of income paid to capital is approximately one
third of the total output. This is generally considered a quite realistic hypothesis
in economic literature. Besides, a significant difference in the dimensions of the
countries is hypothesized.
This section has essentially an introductive aim. Even if under particular hypotheses,
we will draw a general scenario, we will study the evolution of the steady state of
autarky P ∗, and we will introduce a first example of periodic phenomena. These
last will be the basic matter of the next section.
Hence, we will see two different dynamic behaviors. In each one of them we will
fix the parameter λ at some constant value and vary Γ over a significant numerical
interval.
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3.1.1.1. The first dynamic scenario: λ = 0.10, Γ ∈ (0, 1.7).
Let’s fix the parameter λ = 0.10 and varying Γ over the set of values (0, 1.7).
From the proposition 3.2 we know that the interval Γ > 0 can be divided into three
sub-intervals as it follows:
− for Γ ∈
(
9 3
√
30
20 ,∞
)
the steady point P ? is a stable node of the region h1a1;
− for Γ ∈
( 3√12
2 ,
9 3
√
30
20
)
the steady point P ? is a saddle point of the region h0a0;
− for Γ ∈
(
0,
3√12
2
)
the steady point P ? is a stable node of the region h0a0.
In order to follow the evolution of the map, see the figures from 3.3 to 3.11.
Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5
Γh = Γa = 1.70 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.60 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.42 ; λh = λa = 0.10
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Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8
Γh = Γa = 1.398254627679237 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.37 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.30 ; λh = λa = 0.10
Fig. 3.9 Fig. 3.10 Fig. 3.11
Γh = Γa = 1.144714242553332 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.10 ; λh = λa = 0.10 Γh = Γa = 1.08 ; λh = λa = 0.10
At the beginning (Fig. 3.3) there is the only stable state of autarky P ?.
It lies into the region h1a1 and is a node, asymptotically attractive for all the space
(yht > 0) ∩ (yat > 0).
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Then a saddle-node bifurcation occurs and two further steady states appear into
h0a1. They are a stable node and a saddle point (Q1 and S1 of Fig. 3.4).
P ? remains a node of h1a1, but it starts to slide towards the border point
(
Y , Y
)
.
Hence the basins of attraction of Q1 and P ? are separated by the stable set of the
saddle S1.
Later on, another similar saddle-node bifurcation takes place in h1a0, with Q2 node
and S2 saddle.
Now the stable sets of S1 and S2 separate the basins of attraction of the three stable
points P ?, Q1 and Q2 (see Fig. 3.5).
Until Γ is diminishing, the two saddles move towards the point P ? and finally they
merge at the border collision bifurcation of Fig. 3.6 always of pitchfork type.
Crossing the border
(
Y , Y
)
P ? becomes a saddle point, but its stable set still has
positive measure: all the points of the region h1a1, plus two narrow strips “de-
bording” into h0a1 and h1a0, plus the points of the positive half-line of bisector
yat = yht are attracted by P ?. The narrow strips have, as boundaries, the union
of the preimages of any rank of the lines that separate the regions where the map
changes definition.
In the meantime, the two nodes Qj move towards the border lines.
When they cross the border lines, they become foci; then, they will return to be
nodes again.
The first to enter the region h0a0 is the one of Nord-West, Q1, that starts to approach
P ? (Fig. 3.8) (during that time Q1 will change its nature, from focus to node).
In Fig. 3.9 a transcritical bifurcation takes place, with a change of stability between
P ? and Q1: the first becomes a node and continues its running towards the origin,
while the second becomes a saddle and starts to approach the other stable point
Q2, until they merge and disappear, in a saddle-node bifurcation (after Q2 having
become a node).
Finally only the stable node P ? remains, as in Fig. 3.11.
The following picture summarizes the results, in a qualitative view:
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Fig. 3.12
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3.1.1.2. The second dynamic scenario: a supercritical Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation.
In the following, we continue to move the parameter Γ, being the others fixed, but
now we set the imperfect financial market parameter λ at a lower value; exactly,
λ = 0.05.
In such a case, in order to investigate the nature of the steady state of autarky P ?,
these are the divisions of the interval Γ > 0:
− for Γ ∈
(
3 3
√
7220
40 ,∞
)
the steady point P ? is a stable node of the region h1a1;
− for Γ ∈
( 3√12
2 ,
3 3
√
7220
40
)
the steady point P ? is a saddle point of the region h0a0;
− for Γ ∈
(
0,
3√12
2
)
the steady point P ? is a stable node of the region h0a0.
Figures from 3.13 to 3.17 explain the dynamical phenomenon.
At the beginning, we set Γ = 1.16. The system has three fixed points, exactly the
node Q1, the saddle P ? and the focus Q2 (Fig. 3.13).
We are interested in the trajectories starting close to Q2 that, for Γ = 1.16, is an
attractive focus.
Increasing Γ, the eigenvalues of Q2 become in modulus more and more close to 1.
Consequently, the attractive strength of the point is decreasing, until the bifurcation
value, approximately Γ = 1.163426938722213, is reached.
At the bifurcation value, the modulus of the eigenvalues becomes equal to 1 and a
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation (NS) occurs.
Indeed, after a slight increasing of Γ, the focus Q2 becomes repulsive and an attrac-
tive closed curve appears around it (Fig. 3.15, 3.16).
The term ρ2 (λ) in figures 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 indicates the modulus of the complex
eigenvalues of Q2. Figure 3.14 photographs a dynamics quite near the bifurcation
point: the focus Q2 is still attractive and there are no closed curves around it. In
figures 3.15 and 3.16, indeed, Q2 has become unstable and a closed attractive curve
appears around it. The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation has been of supercritical type.
A 6-cycle. Increasing Γ until 1.19, a cycle of period 6 appears around the repulsive
focus Q2 (Fig. 3.17 a and b; periodic points move in an clockwise motion).
From an economic point of view, such a phenomenon is quite interesting.
Suppose that, before the financial integration, the two countries were near their
steady state of autarky equilibrium. If they were over the bisector, after the in-
tegration, they would go towards the steady point Q1, but if they were under the
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bisector, they would be captured by the Sud-East cycle and, during the time, they
would know endogenous fluctuations around the border line yht = Y .
Particularly, the h-Country would continuously cross from a situation of borrowing
constrained to the one of no borrowing constrained, while the a-Country always lies
on low levels of yat.
Fig. 3.13 a Fig. 3.13 b
Γh = Γa = 1.16 ; λh = λa = 0.05
Fig. 3.14 Fig. 3.15 Fig. 3.16
Γh = Γa = 1.163425 ; λh = λa = 0.05 Γh = Γa = 1.16343 ; λh = λa = 0.05 Γh = Γa = 1.16347 ; λh = λa = 0.05
ρ2 (λ) = 0.99999366124131 ρ2 (λ) = 1.000010009026156 ρ2 (λ) = 1.000140792532607
Fig. 3.17 a Fig. 3.17 b
Γh = Γa = 1.19 ; λh = λa = 0.05 ; ρ2 (λ) = 1.088227518080795
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3.2. Heterogeneity
In this section we will consider the case of complete heterogeneity between the two
countries.
Therefore we will assume Lh 6= La, Γh 6= Γa, λh 6= λa.
In this case, many features due to some symmetrical behavior will disappear, but
the steady state of autarky P ? keeps some properties, as we will see in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3.
The steady state of autarky P ? may lie into the regions h0a0, or h1a1; in the latter
case, P ? is a stable node.
The conditions under which P ? lies in h0a0 are:

λh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
= λa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
Γh < (1−λh)
1−α
1−α
Γa < (1−λa)
1−α
1−α
[3.1]
The conditions under which P ? lies in h1a1 are:
Γh ≥
(1−λh)1−α
1−α
Γa ≥ (1−λa)
1−α
1−α
[3.2]
(For a complete proof, see the Appendix to Chapter 3).
3.2.1. Some numerical simulations
In the following steps we will observe some dynamical phenomena obtained via
numerical simulations.
In each case it is Lh = 0.35 and, consequently, La = 0.65. As usual, the share of
income paid to capital is α = 13 .
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3.2.1.1. The first dynamic scenario.
We begin with the dynamics described in figures 3.18 a and b.
In the first picture, conditions [3.2] are satisfied and P ∗ is an asymptotically stable
node of the region h1a1. Then there are other four stable points; respectively a node
and a saddle into the regions h0a1 and into h1a0. The stable sets of the saddles
separate the basins of attraction of the three nodes.
In the second picture, conditions [3.1] are worth and P ∗ is a saddle point. Its stable
set has null measure (not yet as in case of symmetry) and it separates the basins of
attraction of two stable steady points, that are attractive foci.
The bisector yat = yht is no longer a stable set.
Fig. 3.18 a Fig. 3.18 b
Γh = 1.50 ; Γa = 1.49 ; λh = 0.05 ; λa = 0.06 Γh = 1.2085 ; Γa = 1.35 ; λh = 0.05
λa = 0.026402233503035
In the last situation, let’s suppose that, before their financial integration the two
countries lay in the neighborhood of the autarky point P ?. Then, when the financial
integration is complete, they may be attracted significantly away from their initial
position (respectively by Q1 or Q2) and their conditions may differ a lot from one
another. We can see that integration will be convenient for one country, but not at
all for the other one.
3.2.1.2. The second dynamic scenario. A “crater” bifurcation.
Now we will modify the parameters in the following manner: Γh = 1.2085, λh = 0.05,
Γa = 1.35, λa = 0.0564.
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The point P ? is no longer a fixed point for the system.
Moreover, a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation now occurs, as illustrated in the following
figures.
As it is known, a NS bifurcation may be of supercritical, or of subcritical type. In
the first case a closed, attractive curve starts to form at bifurcation, then it grows
up, while the central focus becomes unstable. On the contrary, when the NS is of
subcritical type, a repulsive closed curve appears around the focus when it is still
stable, it decreases and it merges with the fixed point at bifurcation, leaving it in
an unstable equilibrium state. In the latter case, enlarging the analysis from a local
to a global point of view, a phenomenon known in literature as “crater bifurcation”
may occur: two curves, one attracting, the other repelling, coexist with a stable
focus inside. The attracting curve surrounds the repelling one; the latter disappears
at bifurcation point, leaving the attracting curve as the unique attractor.1
In Fig. 3.19 b we see two attractors; they are respectively, the stable focus Q1 and
the closed curve γ, that surrounds the unstable focus Q2. Then there is the steady
state P that is a saddle, whose stable set separates the basins of attraction of Q1 and
γ. The complex eigenvalues of Q2 have modulus ρ2 = 1.000052389992438, then we
can suppose that bifurcation has just occurred. We argue that the NS bifurcation we
are considering is of subcritical type. In such case, the closed curve γ doesn’t come
from the bifurcation point, but preexists at it and remains the unique attractor,
after the focus Q2 has become unstable and the repelling curve has disappeared.
Fig. 3.19 a Fig. 3.19 b Fig. 3.19 c
Γh = 1.2085 ; Γa = 1.35 ; λh = 0.05 ; λa = 0.0564
Later on we will try to analyze these periodic phenomena.
In order to do that, we will do a two dimensional bifurcation diagram for Γa ∈
(1.3, 1.5) and λa ∈ (0.05, 0.065).
See Fig. 3.20. Observing such a figure, we can see that, as generally occurs when a
NS bifurcation takes place, different periodicity regions exist: the Arnold’s tongues.
1For an example of crater bifurcation see Agliari [2].
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Their shape is typical of piece-wise maps: each region involves a stable cycle of
a certain period and its boundary is given by saddle-node and/or border collision
bifurcations, that are responsible of the disappearance of the cycle itself. Generally, if
the NS bifurcation is of supercritical type, regions of different periodicity come from
the boundary of the stable set of the focus. On the contrary, if the NS bifurcation
is of subcritical type, the periodicity regions may open below the bifurcation curve.
The one-dimensional bifurcation diagram of Fig. 3.21 (Γa = 1.38047112, ) proves
that the NS bifurcation we are analyzing is of subcritical type: immediately after
the destabilization of the fixed point, the trajectory is attracted by a large closed
invariant curve. Then we can argue that such a curve does not appear at the
bifurcation, but it exists even when the fixed point is still stable. From the same
figure we can also observe that different cyclical phenomena appear around Q2, as
well as strange attractors and that such attractors cross the border line yht = Y .
To confirm our intuition we present in Fig. 3.22 an enlargement of the bifurcation
diagram. Such enlargement shows that a stable cycle of period 7 coexists with Q2
still stable.
Fig. 3.20 Fig. 3.21 Fig. 3.22
Γh = 1.2085 ; λh = 0.05
The cycle of period 7. Now we will study more deeply the nature of the 7-cycle
appeared in the last figure.
These are the parameter values:
Γh = 1.2085, λh = 0.05, Γa = 1.38047112, λa = 0.0514928.
See Fig. 3.23 a, b.
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Fig. 3.23 a Fig. 3.23 b
Γh = 1.2085 ; Γa = 1.38047112 ; λh = 0.05 ; λa = 0.0514928
The node-cycle C coexists with the fixed, attracting points Q1 and Q2.
This cycle has appeared in the phase space through a saddle-node bifurcation, to-
gether with a saddle cycle S of the same period. The stable set of S separates the
basins of attraction of C and Q2, while the boundary of the basin of attraction of
Q1 has still given by the stable set of the saddle steady state P .
The yellow strips include points that go to the attractive focus Q2, while the green
zone is made by points that tend towards the cycle C.
Look at the Fig. 3.23b and consider the points C1 and S1 that belong, respectively,
to C and S.
The stable set of S1 is made by the two branches ω1 and ω2. As we previously said,
these branches separate the stable set of C1 from the one of Q2.
The unstable set of S1 are the gray lines α1 and α2. The branch α1 connects S1 with
C1, while α2 is spiral-shaped and moves towards Q2.
An homoclinic bifurcation. Let’s see now the sequence of Fig. 3.24 obtained by
increasing λa.
Looking at Fig. 3.24b, we can observe that the branch α2 of the unstable set of the
periodic point S1 of saddle cycle has modified its behavior. Now it reaches a periodic
point of the stable cycle. Then, considering the whole unstable set of the saddle
cycle S, we obtain that it connects the periodic points of the stable cycle C, giving
birth to an invariant closed curve. The branch ω2 of the stable set of S1 as well has
modified its behavior, since now it exits from a repelling closed curves surrounding
the stable focus Q2. The change in the dynamic behavior of the stable and unstable
sets of the saddle cycle S suggests that a homoclinic bifurcation has occurred, having
as consequence the appearance of two invariant closed curves: one attracting, given
by the saddle-node connection; one repelling, bounding the basin of attraction of Q2.
The latter, as λa increases, is involved in the subcritical NS bifurcation of the focus.
Now Q2 still remains an attractive focus, but it is “trapped” in a very circumscribed
area. Points next to the repelling curve, but outside of it, will be attracted by the
stable cycle C and will never reach Q2.
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Fig. 3.24a offers an illustration of the homoclinic tangle associated to the occurrence
of the bifurcation just described. However, it is important to observe that such a
global bifurcation is associated with a piecewise map (the periodic points of the
cycles belong to different regions of definition of the map) then we cannot conclude
that a chaotic attractor exists during the development of the homoclinic tangle.
Fig. 3.24 a Fig. 3.24 b
λa = 0.05149299918 λa = 0.051493
Remark. Let’s consider the last phenomena described in Fig. 3.23 and 3.24.
Imaging that, before their financial markets integration, the two countries lie in a
point P0 quite close to the saddle P .
If the starting point P0 lies in the space over the stable set of P , then the destiny of
the countries, after their financial integration, is quite predictable: they will move
towards Q1.
More interesting is the situation in which P0 lies under the stable set of P .
In case of Fig. 3.23, the destiny of the two countries is hardly predictable.
Indeed they can start along the “yellow” strips and, in such case, after their financial
markets have become integrated, they will go towards the attractive point Q2.
But they can also start along the “green” region and then being attracted by the
7-cycle C.
In this last case, through time, they will know endogenous fluctuations around Q2,
but they will never reach it.
On the contrary, if the parameter values are those of Fig. 3.34 b, the two countries,
starting from P0 located under the stable set of P , will be attracted by the cycle
and involved in endogenous fluctuation, without reaching Q2.
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3.3. The case of “quasi-heterogeneity”.
Finally, we consider a last case in which parameters describing technology, efficiency
and credit market imperfections are different, but population size is equal.
Therefore we set Lh = La = 12 .
This is an intermediate situation between the case of “quasi-symmetry” and the case
of heterogeneity.
We prove that, even in this case, there are periodic equilibria and endogenous fluc-
tuations.
3.3.1. A “crater” bifurcation.
We set the parameter values as it follows.
Lh = La = 12 ; Γh = 1.31 ; λh = 0.05 ; λa = 0.0783.
Modifying the parameter Γa, we can obtain the sequence described in Fig. 3.25,
3.26, 3.27.
Fig. 3.25 a Fig. 3.25 b
Γa = 1.4485 ρ2 (λ) = 0.99995798501051
Fig. 3.26 Fig. 3.27
Γa = 1.4485248202 ; ρ2 (λ) = 0.99998104308917 Γa = 1.44856 ; ρ2 (λ) = 1.000013725884191
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In the first picture there are three fixed points. Two of them are attractive, while
the third is a saddle and its stable set separates the basins of attraction of the other
two.
The modulus of the complex eigenvalues of the focusQ2 is ρ2 (λ) = 0.99995798501051;
it means that the point is quite near its bifurcation step.
We increase the parameter Γa from the initial value 1.4485 to 1.4485248202, as in
figure 3.26. Now it is ρ2 (λ) = 0.99998104308917, therefore the focus Q2 is still
attractive, but nearer its bifurcation.
Now a closed invariant curve (γ) appears around Q2. The curve γ is stable and
inside it another repelling curve separates the basin of attraction of Q2 from the one
of γ itself.
Increasing again Γa we obtain the picture of figure 3.27, in which Q2 has become
unstable (ρ2 (λ) = 1.000013725884191), the repelling curve has disappeared and the
only attractor is the curve γ.
A subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation has occurred and, in the meantime, a
“crater” bifurcation also occurred.
This is a dynamics quite similar to the one described above, in the case of complete
heterogeneity.
To sum up, the case of “quasi heterogeneity” confirms the phenomenon pointed out
by the case of complete heterogeneity: periodic and quasi-periodic equilibria may
exist not only due to a different size of populations, but also under the effects of
differences in technology and productive efficiency.
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3.3.2. Conclusion
In the previous simulations, we have proved the existence of persistent, endogenous
fluctuations, after the integration of financial markets between the two countries has
occurred.
In case of “quasi-symmetry”, differentiation between population dimensions is suffi-
cient to produce phenomena of endogenous fluctuations.
Differently, heterogeneity in efficiency and technological levels (synthesized by Γj)
together with financial imperfection (λj) may also cause periodic and quasi-periodic
phenomena.
This fact is definitively proved by the case of “quasi-heterogeneity”, in which the
populations are supposed to have the same consistency, while the other parameters
are different.
It is to be noted that, in general terms, the absence of endogenous fluctuations
makes a model quite predictable about its long-run evolution. On the contrary
when periodic dynamics occur, the future conditions of the countries involved in the
process of financial integration are hardly predictable and this, of course, has some
consequences about convenience, for a single country, to participate to the reform
process.
This work belongs to the branch of study developed by Matsuyama and other re-
searchers, on macroeconomic effects produced by credit market imperfections, in
integrated financial economies. It extends the results of Kikuchi and Stachurski, en-
larging the set of causes that may originate endogenous periodic dynamics into the
economic environment of the integrated countries: not only different populations,
but also heterogeneity in technology and credit market imperfection.
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4. Appendix to Chapter I
4.1. Proofs of propositions of Chapter 1
4.1.1. Proposition 1.1. Proof.
Relation [1.3] and [1.4].
Being γ = 1, young agents have to solve the following problem:
max U (c1t, c2t+1) = ln (c1t) + βln (c2t+1)s.t. c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt
Setting L = ln (c1t) + βln (c2t+1) + λ
[
wt −
(
c1t + c2t+1rt+1
)]
we obtain the optimal con-
sumption choices of the agents, giving:

∂L
∂c1t
= 0
∂L
∂c2t+1
= 0
∂L
∂λ
= 0

c−11t = λ
βc−12t+1 = λrt+1
c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt

c1t = 1λ
c2t+1 = βrt+1λ
1
λ
+ β
λ
= wt
⇒

cˆ1t = wt1+β
cˆ2t+1 = β1+βwtrt+1
λ = 1+β
wt
Consequently the optimal savings become sˆt = wt − cˆ1t = wt − wt1+β =
(
β
1+β
)
wt and
the marginal propensity of savings is S (β) = β1+β .
In particular, it must be noted that neither cˆ1t, nor sˆt depend on the interest factor
rt+1, while it is cˆ1t = cˆ1t
(
+
wt
)
and sˆt ≡ sˆt
(
+
wt
)
.1
From β > 0, it follows 0 < S (β) < 1 ; S (.) is an injective function, with domain
R+ and range (0; 1).
Relation [1.5] and [1.6].
Now we consider 0 < γ < 1.
The optimization process becomes:
1From now on, we will write f
(
+/−
x
)
to mean that f (.) is positively/negatively correlated to x.
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max U (c1t, c2t+1) =
c1−γ1t −1
1−γ + β
c1−γ2t+1−1
1−γ
s.t. c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt
The lagrangian expression becomes L = c
1−γ
1t −1
1−γ + β
c1−γ2t+1−1
1−γ + λ
[
wt −
(
c1t + c2t+1rt+1
)]
and the first order conditions are:

∂L
∂c1t
= 0
∂L
∂c2t+1
= 0
∂L
∂λ
= 0

c−γ1t = λ
βc−γ2t+1 = λrt+1
c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt

c−γ1t = λ
βc−γ2t+1 =
c−γ1t
rt+1
c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt
c−γ1t = λ
c2t+1
c1t
= (βrt+1)
1
γ
c1t + c2t+1rt+1 = wt

c2t+1 = (βrt+1)
1
γ c1t
c1t = wt
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
⇒

cˆ1t = wt
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
cˆ2t+1 = wt(βrt+1)
1
γ
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
sˆt = wt − cˆ1t = wt − wt
1+ (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1
= wt
(
(βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
)
From that, we obtain the marginal propensity of savings S (rt+1) = (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
.
Particularly, let’s note:
i) The first period optimal consumption is positively correlated to the wage wt and
negatively correlated to the second period lending/borrowing factor rt+1:
cˆ1t = cˆ1t
(
+
wt,
−
rt+1
)
.
Indeed ∂cˆ1t
∂wt
= rt+1
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
> 0 , while ∂cˆ1t
∂rt+1
= −wt(
1
γ
−1)(βrt+1) 1γ(
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
)2 < 0 .
ii) The optimal savings are positively correlated with the interest factor rt+1 as can
be derived observing that sˆt = wt − cˆ1t = wt − cˆ1t
(
+
wt,
−
rt+1
)
.
Then sˆt = sˆt
(
+
rt+1
)
.
For successive uses consider the following assertion:
4.1.2. Proposition 1.A1
For 0 < γ < 1, the marginal propensity of savings S (rt+1) = (βrt+1)
1
γ
rt+1+(βrt+1)
1
γ
is an
increasing function of rt+1 > 0, with range (0, 1).
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Proof.
The thesis comes quite immediately observing that, for x > 0 and 0 < γ < 1, it is:
limx→0+ (βx)
1
γ
x+(βx)
1
γ
= 0 ; limx→+∞ (βx)
1
γ
x+(βx)
1
γ
= 1 ; ∂
∂x
[
(βx)
1
γ
x+(βx)
1
γ
]
= (
1
γ
−1)(βx) 1γ(
x+(βx)
1
γ
)2 > 0
4.1.3. Proposition 1.2. Proof.
We know that W (kt) in an increasing function of kt (see note on assumption i7).
Let’s set ϕ (k) = k
S(Rf ′ (k)) .
ϕ (.) is a monotonic, increasing function of k ∈ (0,+∞). Indeed:
∂ϕ(k)
∂k
=
S
(
Rf
′ (k)
)
−kS′
(
Rf
′ (k)
)
Rf
′′ (k)
[S(Rf ′ (k))]2 > 0
being Rf ′ (k) > 0, S
(
Rf
′ (k)
)
> 0, S ′
(
Rf
′ (k)
)
≥ 0, f ′′ (k) < 0 for k ∈ (0,+∞)
(see proposition 1.A1 and assumptions i2, i3)
Therefore there will be a unique kt+1 s.t. ϕ (kt+1) = RW (kt).
Being W (kt) increasing in kt, if kt or R increase, also ϕ (kt+1) will rise and, being
ϕ (.) increasing, it follows that kt+1 is increasing too.
4.1.4. Proposition 1.3. Proof.
The second part of the proposition, can be extrapolated from the corollary 1 of
Wendner [16].
Hence we will proof that (0, R) in an invariant interval for kt+1.
Step 1.
First we will prove that ψ (0, R) = 0 ∀R > 0 , where ψ (0, R) = lim
kt→0+
ψ (kt, R).
In order to prove that, let’s consider the increasing function ϕ (k) = k
S(Rf ′ (k))
(see demonstration of proposition 1.2).
From assumption i4 and remembering that 0 < S (x) < 1 is an increasing function,
it comes that: ϕ (0) = lim
kt→0+
kt
S(Rf ′ (kt)) = 0
Moreover, from [1.7]:
ϕ (ψ (0, R)) = ϕ
(
lim
kt→0+
ψ (kt, R)
)
= lim
kt→0+
ϕ (ψ (kt, R)) =
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= lim
kt→0+
RW (kt) = R lim
kt→0+
W (kt)
Remembering assumptions i1, i6 and i7:
lim
kt→0+
W (kt) = lim
kt→0+
[
f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt)
]
= lim
kt→0+
f (kt)
[
1− ktf
′ (kt)
f(kt)
]
= 0 .
Then it is proved that ϕ (ψ (0, R)) = 0 and, being ϕ (0) = 0, because of monotonicity
of ϕ (.), it must be ψ (0, R) = 0.
Step 2.
Now we’ll try to identify a superior extreme value for R, say R(+), such that,
if R < R(+), then kt+1 < R.
In order to do this, let’s consider the function Ω (x) = W (x)S
(
xf
′ (x)
)
, that is
continuous in R+, because of the product of two continuous functions.
It can be immediately proved that Ω (0) = 0. Effectively W (0) = 0 and 0 < S (x) <
1.
Let R(+) be the smallest number for which equation Ω (x) = 1 is satisfied (if this
equation doesn’t have solutions, then R(+) = +∞).
Because of continuity of Ω (.) and being proved that Ω (0) = 0, ∀R ∈
(
0;R(+)
)
it
follows:
W (R)S
(
Rf
′ (R)
)
< 1 [1.A1]
Fig. 1.A1
Now, let’s assume kt ∈ (0;R) and R ∈
(
0;R(+)
)
.
Observing that ϕ (ψ (R,R)) = RW (R) and remembering that ϕ (.) is a monotonic
increasing function of kt+1 = ψ
(+
kt,
+
R
)
, it is:
ϕ (kt+1) = ϕ
(
ψ
(+
kt,
+
R
))
< ϕ (ψ (R,R)) = RW (R).
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From relation W (R)S
[
Rf
′ (R)
]
< 1, it follows that RW (R) < R
S[Rf ′ (R)] ,
so ϕ (kt+1) = RW (kt) < RW (R) < RS[Rf ′ (R)] = ϕ (R).
Finally, ϕ (kt+1) < ϕ (R). Then it follows that kt+1 < R. q.e.d.
4.1.5. Proposition 1.4. Proof.
Let kht and kat be the concentrations of capital respectively in h and a.
Because of the opening of the markets, the return of capital must be the same:
f
′ (
kht
)
= f ′ (kat ). This involves kht = kat = kt
From [1.1] it follows that rht = Rhf
′ (kt) and rat = Raf
′ (kt), then, from the hypoth-
esis Rh > Ra, it must be rht > rat .
The interest rates of the two countries are not the same, but the closure of their
financial markets preserves the differential.
Finally, because of different interest rates, never savings are the same, except in the
case γ = 1. Indeed sht = W (kt)S
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
≥ sat = W (kt)S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
.2
4.1.6. Proposition 1.5. Proof.
From relation [1.2] and proposition 1.4, it follows that, in each country, capital will
be produced in different quantities: Rhsht > Rasat ; but free trade will level them:
kht+1 = kat+1 = kt+1.
Therefore, substituting the optimal values into the resource constraint, we obtain:
2kt+1 = Rhsht +Rfsat = W (kt)
[
RhS
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
+RaS
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)]
q.e.d.
4.1.7. Proposition 1.6. Proof.
Remembering that S (.) is a non decreasing function and Ra < Rh, it follows:
RhS
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
+RaS
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
< 2RhS
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
.
From [1.9] we have kt+1 < W (kt)RhS
(
Rhf
′ (kt+1)
)
.
Therefore ϕ (kt+1) = kt+1RhS(Rhf ′ (kt+1)) < W (kt).
Now suppose it is kt ∈ (0;Rh) and Rh ∈
(
0;R(+)
)
.
2This relation occurs with sign “>” when 0 < γ < 1 and with “=” when γ = 1; in the latter case
it is S(rt+1) = β1+β .
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From [1.A1] we know that W (Rh)S
(
Rhf
′ (Rh)
)
< 1.
Remembering that W (.) is an increasing function (see note to assumption i7) we
have:
ϕ (kt+1) = kt+1RhS[Rhf ′ (kt+1)] < W (kt) < W (Rh) <
Rh
RhS[Rhf ′ (Rh)] = ϕ (Rh).
Being ϕ (.) is an increasing function too (see proposition 1.1) it follows that
kt+1 < Rh.
Asymptotic stability comes from proposition 1.3.
4.1.8. Proposition 1.9. Proof.
From st ≤ 12 , it follows kt+1 = Rhst ≤ Rh2 .
We know that the left hand side of [1.10] is an increasing function in kt+1 (see proof
of proposition 1.2). The right hand side is an increasing function of kt (see note to
i7).
Then kA = W−1
 1
2S
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)) is the maximum value that kt can reach.
Finally note that ψ (kA, Rh) = Rh2 .
4.1.9. Proposition 1.10. Proof.
From proposition 1.8, we can write rt+1 = Rhf
′ (ψ (kt, Rh)).
It follows that rt+1 (kt) is a decreasing, continuous function of kt, into the interval
(0, kA], because ψ (kt) is a continuous, increasing function of kt and f
′ (ψ) is a
continuous, decreasing function of ψ. Consequently, the minimum value rt+1 (kt)
can reach on (0, kA] is rt+1 (kA) = Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
4.1.10. Proposition 1.11. Proof.
In home Country: U
(
ch1 ; ch2
)
= (W (kt)−s
h
t )1−γ−1
1−γ +β
[
Rhf
′ (kt+1)−(1−sht )Raf ′ (kt+1)
]1−γ
−1
1−γ
F.O.C. : dU
dsht
= 0 ⇒
−
(
W (kt)− sht
)−γ
+ β
[
Rhf
′ (kt+1)−
(
1− sht
)
Raf
′ (kt+1)
]−γ
Raf
′ (kt+1) = 0
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βRaf
′ (kt+1)
[Rhf ′ (kt+1)−(1−sht )Raf ′ (kt+1)]γ =
1
(W (kt)−sht )γ
(
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ
Rhf
′ (kt+1)−(1−sht )Raf ′ (kt+1) =
1
W (kt)−sht
(
W (kt)− sht
) (
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ = Rhf
′ (kt+1)−
(
1− sht
)
Raf
′ (kt+1)
sht
{
Raf
′ (kt+1) + β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ
}
= W (kt)
[
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ −f ′ (kt+1) (Rh −Ra)
shtRaf
′ (kt+1)
{
1 + β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ
−1}
=
= W (kt)
[
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ − f ′ (kt+1) (Rh −Ra)
sht
{
1 + β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ
−1}
= W (kt) β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ
−1 −
(
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
⇒
sˆht =
W(kt)β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1)
] 1
γ−1−
(
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
1+β
1
γ [Raf ′ (kt+1)]
1
γ−1
In the foreign Country: U (ca1 ; ca2) =
(W (kt)−sat )1−γ−1
1−γ + β
[
satRaf
′ (kt+1)
]1−γ
−1
1−γ
F.O.C. : dU
dsat
= 0 ⇒
− (W (kt)− sat )−γ + β
(
satRaf
′ (kt+1)
)−γ
Raf
′ (kt+1) = 0
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
(satRaf ′ (kt+1))γ =
1
(W (kt)−sat )γ(
βRaf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ
satRaf
′ (kt+1)
= 1
W (kt)−sat
β
1
γ
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ (W (kt)− sat ) = satRaf ′ (kt+1)
sˆat =
β
1
γ W(kt)
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ−1
1+β
1
γ (Raf ′ (kt+1))
1
γ−1
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Now we can express the optimal choices of savings, in term of marginal propensity.
Agents of the a-Country will compare with the interest factor rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1).
Therefore their optimal propensity of savings will be:
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
)
= sˆ
a
t
W (kt) =
β
1
γ
(
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
) 1
γ−1
1+β
1
γ (Raf ′ (kt+1 ))
1
γ−1
For successive developments, notice that 1− S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
= 1
1+β
1
γ (Raf ′ (kt+1))
1
γ−1
Substituting the last expressions into sˆht , we obtain:
sˆht =
W (kt)β
1
γ
[
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
] 1
γ−1
1+β
1
γ [Raf ′ (kt+1 )]
1
γ−1
−
Rh−Ra
Ra
1+β
1
γ [Raf ′ (kt+1 )]
1
γ−1
=
= W (kt) S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
)
−
[
1 − S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
)] (
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
Finally, we have to substitute the optimal values of savings into the resource con-
straint and we are done:
2kt+1 = (1)Rh +
(
sˆht + sˆat − 1
)
Ra ⇒
Now substituting in the resource constraint:
(for brevity let’s set S ≡ S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
and Wt = W (kt))
2kt+1 = Rh +
(
WtS − (1− S)
(
Rh−Ra
Ra
)
+WtS − 1
)
Ra
2kt+1 = 2RaWtS + S (Rh −Ra)
kt+1 −
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S = RaWtS ⇒
kt+1−
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
S(Raf ′ (kt+1)) =RaW(kt)
4.1.11. Proposition 1.12. Proof.
The left hand side of [1.13] is a continuous, increasing function of kt+1. Indeed:
∂
∂kt+1
kt+1−(Rh−Ra2 )S(Raf ′ (kt+1 ))
S(Raf ′ (kt+1 ))
 =
(
1−
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
′
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
Raf
′′ (kt+1)
)
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
−
(
kt+1−
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1 )
))
RaS
′
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
f
′′ (kt+1)
[S(Raf ′ (kt+1))]2 =
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=
S
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
−kt+1RaS′
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
f
′′ (kt+1)
[S(Raf ′ (kt+1))]2 > 0 (because of assumption i3 and the
positivity of S ′
(
Raf
′ (kt+1)
)
) .
The right hand side is a continuous, increasing function of kt (see note of assumption
i7).
4.1.12. Proposition 1.13. Proof.
For brevity, let’s set Sa = S
(
Raf
′ (Rh
2
))
and Sh = S
(
Rhf
′ (Rh
2
))
.
Now, let’s consider that kB is the first period capital stock for which
Rh
2 −
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
(
Raf
′
(
Rh
2
))
S
(
Raf ′
(
Rh
2
)) =RaW (kB).
From [1.13], it means that φ (kB, Rh, Ra) = Rh2 .
Then W (kB) =
Rh
2 −
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
Sa
RaSa .
Remembering the previous proposition 1.8, it is ψ (kA, Rh) = Rh2 .
Thus W (kA) = 12Sh .
We are ready to prove that W (kB) > W (kA).
Indeed W (kB) > W (kA) ⇔
Rh
2 −
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
Sa
RaSa >
1
2Sh ⇔
RhSh
RaSa
> 1−Sh1−Sa .
The latter relation is true, because, for hypotheses, Rh > Ra and Sh > Sa and we
are done.
4.1.13. Proposition 1.14. Proof.
From the main hypothesis rt+1 = Raf
′ (kt+1) and from proposition 1.12, it follows
that rt+1 = Raf
′ (φ (kt, Rh, Ra)), where φ (kt) is a continuous, increasing function of
kt.
f
′ (φ) is a continuous, decreasing function of φ (assumption i3).
It follows that rt+1 (kt) is a continuous, decreasing function of kt. The maximum
value it can reach over the interval [kB;R) is rt+1 (kB) = Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
4.1.14. Proposition 1.16. Proof.
First, let’s note that
ch1t = W (kt)− sht ; ch2t+1 = (1)Rhf ′
(
Rh
2
)
−
(
1− sht
)
rt+1
ca1t = W (kt)− sat ; ca2t+1 = sat rt+1
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In home Country: U
(
ch1t , c
h
2t+1
)
=(W (kt)−s
h
t )1−γ−1
1−γ + β
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)
−(1−sht )rt+1
)1−γ
−1
1−γ
F.O.C.: dU
dsht
= 0 ⇒
−
(
W (kt)− sht
)−γ
+ βrt+1
(
Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
−
(
1− sht
)
rt+1
)−γ
= 0
βrt+1(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)
−(1−sht )rt+1
)γ = 1(W (kt)−sht )γ
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1
(
W (kt)− sht
)
= Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
−
(
1− sht
)
rt+1
sht
(
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 + rt+1
)
= W (kt) β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 + rt+1 −Rhf ′
(
Rh
2
)
⇒
sˆht =
W(kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1−Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
In foreign Country: U
(
ca1t , c
a
2t+1
)
=(W (kt)−s
a
t )1−γ−1
1−γ + β
(sat rt+1)1−γ−1
1−γ
F.O.C.: dU
dsat
= 0 ⇒
− (W (kt)− sat )−γ + βrt+1 (sat rt+1)−γ = 0
βrt+1
(sat rt+1)γ =
1
(W (kt)−sat )γ ; β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 (W (kt)− sat ) = sat rt+1 ;
sat
(
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 + rt+1
)
= W (kt) β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 ⇒
sˆat =
W(kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
The interest factor. Applying the condition sˆht + sˆat = 1, we obtain:
W (kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1−Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
+ W (kt)β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1
β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1+rt+1
= 1 ;
2W (kt) β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 − β
1
γ r
1
γ
t+1 = Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
⇒
rt+1 (kt) =
 Rhf ′(Rh2 )
β
1
γ (2W(kt)−1)
γ q.e.d.
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4.1.15. Proposition 1.17. Proof.
The interest factor rt+1 over the interval (kA, kB) .
First we consider the expression rt+1 (kt)=
 Rhf ′(Rh2 )
β
1
γ (2W (kt)−1 )
γ over the interval (kA, kB) .
Because sht + sat = 1 and considering that savings are proper fraction of incomes, it
must be W (kt) > 12 .
Thus rt+1 (kt) is continuous.
Its first derivative is:
drt+1(kt)
dkt
= −
2γW ′ (kt)
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
))γ
β(2W (kt)−1)γ+1 < 0.
Then rt+1 (kt) is decreasing.
Now consider what it follows:
W (kA) = 1
2S
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
)) and S (rt+1) = β 1γ r 1γ−1t+1
1+β
1
γ r
1
γ−1
t+1
from which S(rt+1)1−S(rt+1) = β
1
γ r
1
γ
−1
t+1
W (kB) =
Rh
2 −
(
Rh−Ra
2
)
S
(
Raf
′
(
Rh
2
))
RaS
(
Raf ′
(
Rh
2
))
By these relations we can extend the expression above to the limit point kA and kB:
lA = lim
kt→k+A
rt+1 (kt) =
Rhf ′(Rh2 )S(Rhf ′(Rh2 ))
β
1
γ
(
1−S
(
Rhf
′
(
Rh
2
))) γ = [Rhf ′ (Rh2 )]γ lA1−γ ⇒
lA = Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
lB = lim
kt→k−B
rt+1 (kt) =
Raf ′(Rh2 )S(Raf ′(Rh2 ))
β
1
γ
(
1−S
(
Raf
′
(
Rh
2
))) γ = [Raf ′ (Rh2 )]γ (lB)1−γ ⇒
lB = Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
The interest factor rt+1 over the interval (0, kA].
From proposition 1.10 we know that, when kt ≤ kA, rt+1 (kt) = Rhf ′ (ψ (kt, Rh)) is a
continuous, decreasing function of kt. Its minimum value is rt+1 (kA) = Rhf
′ (Rh
2
)
.
The interest factor rt+1 over the interval [kB,+∞).
From proposition 1.12, when kt ≥ kB, the expression of the interest factor is
rt+1 (kt) = Raf
′ (φ (kt, Rh, Ra)).
For kt = kB it is rt+1 (kB) = Raf
′ (Rh
2
)
. As above, rt+1 (kt) is continuous and
decreasing.
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Summarizing: rt+1 (kt) =

Rhf
′ (ψ (kt, Rh)) if kt ≤ kA Rhf ′(Rh2 )
β
1
γ (2W (kt)−1)
γ if kA < kt < kB
Raf
′ (φ (kt, Rh, Ra)) if kt ≥ kB
4.1.16. Proposition 1.19. Proof.
From st =
(
β
1+β
)
W (kt) and being W (kt) an increasing function (see note to as-
sumption i7) it follows that, for kt ≤ kA, it is st ≤ 12 and production of capital goods
will be concentrated only in home Country.
Interest factor will necessary be rt+1 = Rhf
′ (kt+1). For agents in home Country
will be indifferent between borrowing or lending, while for those in foreign Country,
lending will strictly more convenient than borrowing.
From the resource constraint 2kt+1 = (2st)Rh and expression of st, comes immedi-
ately the relation [1.20].
4.1.17. Proposition 1.22. Proof.
From the assumption f (kt) = Akαt , with 0 < α < 1, it follows:
f
′ (kt) = αAkα−1t ;
f
′′ (kt) = −α (1− α)Akα−2t ;
ktf
′ (kt)
f(kt) =
αAkαt
Akαt
= α;
W (kt) = (1− α)Akαt ;
W
′ (kt) = α (1− α)Akα−1t ;
σ (k) = α(1−α)A
2k2α−1t
α(1−α)A2k2α−1t
= 1
Therefore, all the assumptions from i0 to i9 are verified.
4.1.18. Proposition 1.23. Proof.
Let’s see some useful transformations:
From f (kt) = Akαt it follows:
Rjf
′ (kt+1) = αARjkα−1t+1 .
From [1.4] and [1.6] it is:
S
(
Rjf
′ (kt+1)
)
=
β
1
γ
(
Rjf
′ (kt+1)
) 1
γ−1
1+β
1
γ (Rjf ′ (kt+1))
1
γ−1
= (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
j k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
1+(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
j k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
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The relation [1.10] becomes:
1+(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
h
k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
h
k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
kt+1 = (1− α)RhAkαt ⇒
k
γ+(1−α)(1−γ)
γ
t+1 + (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
h kt+1 = (1− α) (α)
1−γ
γ R
1
γ
h A
1
γ β
1
γkαt
The relation [1.13] becomes:
kt+1−
(
Rh−Ra
2
) (αA) 1−γγ β 1γ R 1−γγa k− (1−α)(1−γ)γt+1
1+(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
a k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
a k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
1+(αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γ R
1−γ
γ
a k
− (1−α)(1−γ)γ
t+1
= Ra (1− α)Akαt
k
γ+(1−α)(1−γ)
γ
t+1 + (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
a kt+1 = (αA)
1−γ
γ β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
a
(
Rh−Rf
2 + (1− α) ARakαt
)
Similarly, relations [1.20] and [1.21] become:
kt+1 =
(
β
1+β
)
(1− α) ARhkαt
kt+1 = Rh−Rf2 +
(
β
1+β
)
(1− α) ARakαt
4.1.19. Proposition 1.24. Proof.
The first branch of G (kt,Rh, Ra). In order to prove the above assertion, let’s
consider the “branch” ψ (kt, Rh), as function of kt , with parameter Rh.
Solving the system
kt+1 = ψ (kt, Rh)kt+1 = kt we obtain the unique solution k∗ψ =
[
2
3ARh
(
β
1+β
)]3
2 .
Deriving the function and substituting the expression of k∗ψ, we have:
∂ψ(kt,Rh)
∂kt
= 29ARh
(
β
1+β
)
k
− 23
t ⇒ ∂ψ(k
∗
ψ ,Rh)
∂kt
= 13
This function ψ (kt, Rh) is defined for kt ≤ kA and the condition k∗ψ ≤ kA involves
Rh
2 ≤ kA.
Summarizing, if Rh2 ≤ kA, then the first branch of G (kt,Rh, Ra) converges to a stable
steady state k∗ψ.
In such case the production of capital goods takes place only in home Country.
90
Appendix
The second branch of G (kt,Rh, Ra). Now we are considering the branch φ (kt, Rh, Ra),
as function of kt , with parameters Rh and Ra.
Computing its first derivative, we obtain:
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= 29ARa
(
β
1+β
)
k
− 23
t > 0;
lim
kt → 0+
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= +∞ and
lim
kt → +∞
∂φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= 0.
Moreover its second derivative is ∂2φ(kt,Rh,Ra)
∂k2t
= − 427ARa
(
β
1+β
)
k
− 53
t < 0 .
Therefore this function is an increasing one, but with declining slope.
It starts from the point A
(
kA; Rh2
)
, where the value of its derivative is
∂φ(kA,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
= Ra6
(
4Aβ
3(1+β)
)3
= Ra6kA .
Now suppose it is Rh2 ≤ kA. With this condition the first branch of G (kt,Rh, Ra)
has a unique steady state k∗ψ ≤ kA.
Then the point A is under the bisector or, at limit, on the bisector and the slope of
the function φ (kt, Rh, Ra) in A is less than 1, as it can be easy proved. 3
Because of declining slope of φ (kt, Rh, Ra) the function will never intercept the
bisector into the interval kt > kA. So, the map G (kt,Rh, Ra) has the unique steady
state k∗ψ.
On the other hand, suppose it is kA < Rh2 . In such case the first branch of the map
ends before to intercept the bisector.
The second branch φ (kt, Rh, Ra) starts always in A, but now that point is over the
bisector.
Because of declining slope of the curve, it has to intercept the bisector in a point on
the right relative to A. In this way, the function φ (kt, Rh, Ra) has a unique steady
state k∗φ > kA.
Again, this point is stable, because it must necessary be ∂φ(k
∗
φ,Rh,Ra)
∂kt
< 1; if not the
curve φ (kt, Rh, Ra) couldn’t have intercepted the bisector.
That proves the thesis.
4.1.20. Proposition 1.25. Proof.
With the choice of parameters α = 13 and γ =
2
5 , the relation [1.24] becomes:
3Suppose it is Ra6kA ≥ 1 and kA ≥ Rh2 . Then Ra ≥ 6kA ≥ 3Rh. This is absurd, because, for
hypothesis, Ra < Rh
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
k2t+1 +
(
ARh
3
) 3
2 β
5
2kt+1 = 2
(
ARh
3
) 5
2 β
5
2k
1
3
t if kt ≤ kA
Rh
2 if kA < kt < kB
k2t+1 +
(
ARa
3
) 3
2 β
5
2kt+1 =
(
Rh−Ra
2
) (
ARa
3
) 3
2 β
5
2 + 2
(
ARa
3
) 5
2 β
5
2k
1
3
t if kt ≥ kB
and substituting Vj = 23ARj , Cj = β
5
2
(
ARj
3
) 3
2 , H = Rh−Ra2 :
k2t+1 + Chkt+1 − VhChk
1
3
t = 0 if kt ≤ kA
Rh
2 if kA < kt < kB
k2t+1 + Cakt+1 −HCa − VaCak
1
3
t = 0 if kt ≥ kB
Finally, solving and omitting the negative values, we obtain the [1.27]
Now we can obtain the separating values for kt, imposing the conditions:
kA: ψ (kA, Rh) = Rh2 and kB: φ (kB, Rh, Ra) =
Rh
2
1
2
√
C2h + 4VhChk
1
3
t − 12Ch = Rh2 ⇒ kA =
(
R2h+2ChRh
4VhCh
)3
1
2
√
C2a + 4HCa + 4VaCak
1
3
t − 12Ca = Rh2 ⇒ kB =
(
R2h+2CaRh−4HCa
4VaCa
)3
=
(
R2h+2CaRa
4VaCa
)3
Remark. It was proved in general terms that, if Ra < Rh, then kA < kB (see
proposition 1.13).
We can easily verify that result here.
From [1.28] and [1.29], kA < kB ⇒ R
2
h+2ChRh
4VhCh <
R2h+2CaRa
4VaCa , from which:
R2hVaCa + 2VaCaChRh < R2hVhCh + 2CaRaVhCh
2CaCh (VaRh − VhRa) < R2h (VhCh − VaCa).
But VaRh − VhRa = 23ARaRh − 23ARhRa = 0, while VhCh − VaCa > 0 whenever
Rh > Ra and we are done.
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5. Appendix to Chapter II
5.1. Proofs of propositions of Chapter 2
5.1.1. Proposition 2.6. Proof.
Being P ?
(
[(1− α) Γ] 11−α , [(1− α) Γ] 11−α
)
and Y =
(
1−λ
(1−α)Γ
) 1
α it follows that
P ? ∈ h1a1, when it is [(1− α) Γ]
1
1−α ≥
(
1−λ
(1−α)Γ
) 1
α ; that involves Γ ≥ (1−λ)1−α1−α .
On the opposite case, P ? ∈ h0a0.
The steady point P ?into the region h1a1.
Into region h1a1 the map becomes
yht+1 =
(1−α)Γ
2 (y
α
ht + yαat)
yat+1 = (1−α)Γ2 (y
α
ht + yαat)
and P ? is its unique
steady state solution.
The jacobian matrix of the system calculated in P ? is:
Jh1a1 (P ?) =α2
[
1 1
1 1
]
; detJh1a1 (P ?) = 0 ; trJh1a1 (P ?) = α
Therefore its eigenvalues are µ1 = 0 and µ2 = α and its eigenvectors are [1,−1]T
and [1, 1]T .
This proves that P ? is a node, asymptotically attractive.
Whichever is the starting point (yh0, ya0) ∈ h1a1, just at the first iteration, the
system reaches the bisector and, by this way, the steady point P ?.
On the other hand, because in the region h0a0 and along the bisector yht = yat = yt
the map is
yht+1 = (1− α) Γyαtyat+1 = (1− α) Γyαt , it can trivially be noted that yjt+1 ≷ yt
if yt ≶ [(1− α) Γ]
1
1−α . It means that a point starting along the bisector, into the
region h0a0, moves towards the steady point P ? of h1a1. This proves that the basin
of attraction of P ? must to include the set
]
O, Y
[
∪ h1a1.
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The steady point P ? into the region h0a0.
In the region h0a0 the map is:
Mh0a0 (yht , yat) :

yht+1 = m (yht, yat) = 1τ(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α
yat+1 = n (yht, yat) = 1τ(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyαat
) 1
1−α
Now we are going to study the nature of the point P ?. In order to do that, we will
calculate the jacobian matrix of the system:
Jh0a0 =
[
∂m
∂yht
∂m
∂yat
∂n
∂yht
∂n
∂yat
]
∂m(yht,yat)
∂yht
= 1
τ(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α
[
αΓyα−1
ht
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
− 1
τ(yht,yat)
∂τ(yht,yat)
∂yht
]
∂n(yht,yat)
∂yat
= 1
τ(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyαat
) 1
1−α
[
αΓyα−1at
1−(1−α)Γyαat −
1
τ(yht,yat)
∂τ(yht,yat)
∂yat
]
∂m(yht,yat)
∂yat
= − 1
τ2(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α ∂τ(yht,yat)
∂yat
∂n(yht,yat)
∂yht
= − 1
τ2(yht,yat)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyαat
) 1
1−α ∂τ(yht,yat)
∂yht
∂F (yjt)
∂yjt
= αΓy
α−1
jt
(1−(1−α)Γyαjt)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyαjt
) 1
1−α
τ (yht, yat) =
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α+
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
at
) 1
1−α
(1−α)Γ(yαht+yαat)
∂τ(yht,yat)
∂yht
=
αΓyα−1
ht
(1−(1−α)Γyαht)
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α (yαht+yαat)−
[(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
ht
) 1
1−α+
(
αΓλ
1−(1−α)Γyα
at
) 1
1−α
]
αyα−1
ht
(1−α)Γ(yαht+yαat)
2
Substituting the symmetric coordinates of P ? (p, p), we obtain:
∂m(P ?)
∂yht
= 1
τ(P ?)
(
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
[
αΓpα−1
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
− 1
τ(P ?)
∂τ(P ?)
∂yht
]
∂n(P ?)
∂yat
= 1
τ(P ?)
(
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
[
αΓpα−1
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
− 1
τ(P ?)
∂τ(P ?)
∂yat
]
∂m(P ?)
∂yat
= − 1
τ2(P ?)
(
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
∂τ(P ?)
∂yat
∂n(P ?)
∂yht
= − 1
τ2(P ?)
(
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
∂τ(P ?)
∂yht
∂τ(P ?)
∂yht
= ∂τ(P ?)
∂yat
=
α
[
Γpα
1−(1−α)Γpα−1
]
( αΓλ1−(1−α)Γpα )
1
1−α
2(1−α)Γpα+1 =
α
[
Γ[(1−α)Γ]
α
1−α
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
−1
](
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
2[(1−α)Γ]
2
1−α
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τ (P ?) = 1
[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
(
αΓλ
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
Hence:
η = ∂m(P ?)
∂yht
= ∂n(P ?)
∂yat
= α2
(
1+Γ[(1−α)Γ]
α
1−α−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
)
and β = ∂m(P ?)
∂yat
= ∂n(P ?)
∂yht
= α2
(
1−Γ[(1−α)Γ]
α
1−α−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
)
The jacobian matrix becomes:
Jh0a0 (P ?) =
[
η β
β η
]
Then: Tr [Jh0f0 (P ?)] = 2η ; det [Jh0f0 (P ?)] = η2 − β2
The eigenvalues can be obtained from µ2 − 2ηµ+ η2 − β2 = 0.
Therefore: µ1 = η + β = α and µ2 = η − β = αΓ[(1−α)Γ]
α
1−α
1−[(1−α)Γ]
1
1−α
The eigenvectors derive from (Jh0f0 (P ?)− µkI)uk = 0 ⇒[
a− µk b
b a− µk
] [
u1k
u2k
]
= 0 for k = 1 , 2.
For k = 1 it is µ1 = a+ b then
[ −b b
b −b
] [
u11
u21
]
= 0 ⇒ u1 =
[
1
1
]
For k = 2 it is µ2 = a− b then
[
b b
b b
] [
u12
u22
]
= 0 ⇒ u2 =
[
1
−1
]
Now, the first eigenvalue is certainly positive and less than 1. So we have to consider
the second one.
Let’s observe, at the beginning, that the condition P ? ∈ h0a0 involves
[(1− α) Γ] 11−α < (1− λ) < 1, then µ2 is positive.
The condition µ2 < 1 implies Γ < 1(1−α)α .
Comparing this last condition, with Γ < (1−λ)
1−α
1−α by which P
? belongs to h0a0, it
follows that if α > λ, then 1(1−α)α <
(1−λ)1−α
1−α and P
? ∈ h0a0 may be a stable node,
or a saddle point, while if α ≤ λ, it is 1(1−α)α ≥ (1−λ)
1−α
1−α and P
? ∈ h0a0 is always a
stable node.
Finally, even if P ? is a saddle point, its stable set has positive measure and includes]
O, Y
[
∪ h1a1. In fact its stable path coincides with the bisector and we know that
a point starting in h1a1 immediately reaches the bisector and, by this way, the point
P ?.
That proves the thesis.
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5.1.2. Proposition 2.7. Proof. The regions h1a1 and h0a0.
The region h1a1.
About the region h1a1 it is sufficient to invoke the general outcomes we have found
above.
This region, at the most, can only contain the fixed point P ?
(
Γ2
4 ,
Γ2
4
)
that is a stable
node.
The only condition required is Γ ≥ 2√1− λ, that assures P ? ∈ h1a1.
The region h0a0.
Now we will consider the region h0a0, about which there are some more articulate
results.
Under the hypothesis α = 12 the map system becomes:
Mh0a0
(
α = 12
)
:

yht+1 =
 12 Γ(√yht+√yat)1
(1− 12 Γ√yht)2
+ 1
(1− 12 Γ√yat)2
 1
(1− 12 Γ√yht)
2 yht < 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
yat+1 =
 12 Γ(√yht+√yat)1
(1− 12 Γ√yht)2
+ 1
(1− 12 Γ√yat)2
 1
(1− 12 Γ√yat)
2 yat < 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
In order to find the fixed points of the map, we will assume yjt+1 = yjt = yj
Null solution will be ignored.
yh =
 12 Γ(√yh+√ya)1
(1− 12 Γ√yh)2
+ 1
(1− 12 Γ√ya)2
 1
(1− 12 Γ√yh)
2 yh < 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
√
yh
(
1− 12Γ
√
yh
)
= √ya
(
1− 12Γ
√
ya
)
ya < 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
Let’s substitute xj =
√
yj for j = h , a. Hence 0 < xj < 2Γ (1− λ)
x2h =
 12 Γ(xh+xa)1
(1− 12 Γxh)2
+ 1
(1− 12 Γxa)2
 1
(1− 12 Γxh)
2 xh <
2
Γ (1− λ)[
1
2Γ (xh + xa)− 1
]
(xh − xa) = 0 xa < 2Γ (1− λ)
By this way we find, at first, the already known solution of autarky P?
(
Γ2
4 ,
Γ2
4
)
.
Then there are two other fixed points:
x2h =
 12 Γ(xh+xa)1
(1− 12 Γxh)2
+ 1
(1− 12 Γxa)2
 1
(1− 12 Γxh)
2 xh <
2
Γ (1− λ)
xh + xa = 2Γ xa <
2
Γ (1− λ)
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
1
2Γ
2x2h − Γxh + 1− 14Γ2 = 0 xh < 2Γ (1− λ)
xh + xa = 2Γ xa <
2
Γ (1− λ)x
?
h1,2 =
1±
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ
x?a1,2 =
1∓
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ
⇒
y
?
h =
1
2 Γ
2±2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ2
y?a =
1
2 Γ
2∓2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ2
Eventually we obtain two symmetric, fixed points
Q1
( 1
2Γ
2+2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2 ,
1
2Γ
2−2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2
)
; Q2
( 1
2Γ
2−2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2 ,
1
2Γ
2+2
√
1
2Γ2−1
Γ2
)
.
5.1.2.1. The fixed points Q1 and Q2. Nature and stability.
The existence of these points preliminary requires 12Γ
2− 1 > 0. That is Γ > √2 (for
Γ =
√
2, it is Q1 ≡ Q2 ≡ P ?).
In order to assure their positivity, it must be 1−
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 > 0. It involves Γ < 2 .
Moreover boundary conditions take 1+
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ <
2
Γ (1− λ), that is√
1
2Γ2 − 1 < 1− 2λ.
This last condition is not satisfied for λ ≥ 12 , while for λ < 12 it becomes
Γ < 2
√
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1.
Therefore:
If λ ≥ 12 there are not any points Q1 and Q2 into the region h0a0.
If λ < 12 there are three conditions needed for the points Q1 and Q2 to exist and
stay into h0a0:
− to be real and distinct: Γ > √2
− to be positive: Γ < 2
− to stay into h0a0: Γ < 2
√
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1.
Being for hypothesis 0 < λ < 1 it is easy to prove that the relation
√
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1 < 1 is always verified; consequently, the second condition may be
omitted.
Summarizing, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the two distinct,
fixed points Q1 and Q2 into h0a0 are:λ <
1
2√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1
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Nature. This part requires a straight manipulation of data; we will do it only for
Q1, being the one of Q2 deducible for symmetry, as we can prove later.
Resuming previous outcomes for a generic α and adapting them to the present case
α = 12 , we have some results described in the following.
The jacobian matrix is (see demonstration of proposition 2.6):
α= 12
Jh0a0 =
 ∂m(Q1)∂yht ∂m(Q1)∂yat
∂n(Q1)
∂yht
∂n(Q1)
∂yat

∂m(Q1)
∂yht
= 1
τ(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2  12 Γ√
yhQ1
(
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
) − 1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht

∂n(Q1)
∂yat
= 1
τ(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2  12 Γ√
yaQ1
(
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
) − 1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat

∂m(Q1)
∂yat
= − 1
τ2(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
∂n(Q1)
∂yht
= − 1
τ2(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
Q1
( 1
2 Γ
2+2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ2 ,
1
2 Γ
2−2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
Γ2
)
In order to simplify the relations above, we set s = 1+
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 , t = 1−
√
1
2Γ2 − 1
and derive some useful relations:
s+ t = 2 ; s2 + t2 = Γ2 ; s3 + t3 = 2
(
Γ2 −
√
2− 12Γ2
)
; s4 + t4 = Γ4 + Γ2 − 4;
st = 2− 12Γ2; 1t + 1s = 22− 12 Γ2 ;
1
t2 +
1
s2 =
Γ2
(2− 12 Γ2)
2 ; st +
t
s
= Γ22− 12 Γ2 ;
t
s2 +
s
t2 =
3Γ2−4
(2− 12 Γ2)
2√
1
2Γ2 + 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = s ;
√
1
2Γ2 − 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = t(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
=
 12 Γλ
1− 12
√
1
2 Γ2+2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
2 = Γ2λ2
t2
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
=
 12 Γλ
1− 12
√
1
2 Γ2−2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
2 = Γ2λ2
s2
√
yhQ1 =
1
Γ
√
1
2Γ2 + 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = sΓ
√
yaQ1 =
1
Γ
√
1
2Γ2 − 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = tΓ
√
yhQ1 +
√
yaQ1 =
1
Γ
(√
1
2Γ2 + 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 +
√
1
2Γ2 − 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1
)
= 2Γ
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1− 12Γ√yhQ1 = 1− 12
√
1
2Γ2 + 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = t2
1− 12Γ√yaQ1 = 1− 12
√
1
2Γ2 − 2
√
1
2Γ2 − 1 = s2
τ (Q1) =
(
2Γλ
2−
√
2Γ2−4
)2
+
(
2Γλ
2+
√
2Γ2−4
)2
√
2
4 (
√
2+
√
Γ2−2)+
√
2
4 (
√
2−√Γ2−2) =
Γ4λ2
s2t2
1
τ(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
= s2Γ2
1
τ(Q1)
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
= t2Γ2
1
2 Γ√
yhQ1
(
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
) = 12 Γ
1
Γ
√
1
2 Γ2+2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
(
1− 12
√
1
2 Γ2+2
√
1
2 Γ2−1
) = Γ2
st
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
=
Γ
(√
yhQ1
+
√
yaQ1
)
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
−
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
−
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
Γ√yhQ1
(√
yhQ1
+√yaQ1
)2 = Γ4λ24s ( 4t3 − 1t2 − 1s2)
1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
= st24
(
4
t3 − 1t2 − 1s2
)
= δ
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
=
Γ
(√
yhQ1
+
√
yaQ1
)
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
−
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yhQ1
)2
−
(
1
2 Γλ
1− 12 Γ
√
yaQ1
)2
Γ√yaQ1
(√
yhQ1
+√yaQ1
)2 = Γ4λ24t ( 4s3 − 1t2 − 1s2)
1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
= s2t4
(
4
s3 − 1t2 − 1s2
)
= ε
δ + ε = st4
[
4
(
1
t2 +
1
s2
)
−
(
1
t
+ 1
s
)
−
(
t
s2 +
s
t2
)]
= Γ24−Γ2
∂m(Q1)
∂yht
= s2Γ2
(
Γ2
st
− 1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
)
= s2Γ2
(
Γ2
st
− δ
)
= s4
(
s2+t2+4t
s2+t2
)
∂n(Q1)
∂yat
= t2Γ2
(
Γ2
st
− 1
τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
)
= t2Γ2
(
Γ2
st
− ε
)
= t4
(
s2+t2+4s
s2+t2
)
∂m(Q1)
∂yat
= − s2Γ2 1τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
= − s2εΓ2
∂n(Q1)
∂yht
= − t2Γ2 1τ(Q1)
∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
= − t2δΓ2
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det
(
α= 12
Jh0a0
)
= stΓ2
[
Γ2
st
− (δ + ε)
]
= 12
tr
(
α= 12
Jh0a0
)
= s4
(
s2+t2+4t
s2+t2
)
+ t4
(
s2+t2+4s
s2+t2
)
= 8−Γ22Γ2
The eigenvalues of the jacobian matrix will come from: µ2 −
(
8−Γ2
2Γ2
)
µ+ 12 = 0
µ1,2 = 8−Γ
2±√64−7Γ4−16Γ2
4Γ2
Therefore the eigenvalues are real under the condition 64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 ≥ 0.
Adapting it to our contest, we have 0 < Γ ≤ 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
.
Remembering that a necessary condition for the existence of Q1 is Γ >
√
2 (and
supposing the existence of Q1) we obtain:
− if √2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
, then Q1 is a node;
− if it is 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
< Γ, then Q1 is a focus.
Stability. First, supposing that Q1 is a node, the conditions −1 < µj < 1 involve:
−1 < 8−Γ2+
√
64−7Γ4−16Γ2
4Γ2 < 1
−1 < 8−Γ2−
√
64−7Γ4−16Γ2
4Γ2 < 1√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)

√
64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 < 5Γ2 − 8
−3Γ2 − 8 < −√64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 < 5Γ2 − 8
√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)

√
64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 < 5Γ2 − 8√
64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 < 3Γ2 + 8
√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)

√
64− 7Γ4 − 16Γ2 < 5Γ2 − 8
√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)

√
2 < Γ
√
2 < Γ < 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
Therefore, when Q1 is a node it is certainly stable.
100
Appendix

(
8−Γ2
4Γ2
)2
+
(√
7Γ4+16Γ2−64
4Γ2
)2
< 1
Γ > 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)

always verified
Γ > 2
√
2
7
(
2
√
2− 1
)
In conclusion, even when it is a focus, Q1 is stable.
The stable point Q2. At last, we will prove that all the outcomes above can worth
even for the point Q2.
In fact yhQ2 = yaQ1 and yaQ2 = yhQ1 and, from a laborious but trivially manipulation,
it can be proved that τ (Q2) = τ (Q1) , ∂τ(Q2)∂yht =
∂τ(Q1)
∂yat
, ∂τ(Q2)
∂yat
= ∂τ(Q1)
∂yht
.
Hence: ∂m(Q2)
∂yht
= ∂n(Q1)
∂yat
; ∂n(Q2)
∂yat
= ∂m(Q1)
∂yht
; ∂m(Q2)
∂yat
= ∂n(Q1)
∂yht
; ∂n(Q2)
∂yht
= ∂m(Q1)
∂yat
The jacobian matrix Jh0a0 (Q2) can be obtained from Jh0a0 (Q1) changing the first
raw/column with the second one; therefore it has the same eigenvalues of the pre-
vious matrix.
Existence, nature and stability of Q2 hold under the same conditions as Q1.
5.1.3. Proposition 2.8. Proof. The regions h0a1 and h1a0.
Because of the symmetry of the map [2.9b] we will consider only the region h0a1 and
extend the results to the opposite region h1a0.
Into the region h0a1 the map becomes:
Mh0a0
(
α = 12
)
:

yht+1 =
 Γ2 (√yht+√yat)λ2
(1− 12 Γ√yht)2
+1
 λ2(1− 12 Γ√yht)2
yat+1 =
 Γ2 (√yht+√yat)λ2
(1− 12 Γ√yht)2
+1

with yht < 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
and yat ≥ 4
(
1−λ
Γ
)2
As usual, we assume yjt+1 = yjt = yj and xj =
√
yj. Then:
x2h =
 Γ2 (xh+xa)λ2
(1−Γ2 xh)2
+1
 λ2(1−Γ2 xh)2
x2a =
Γ
2 (xh+xa)
λ2
(1−Γ2 xh)2
+1
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with xh < 2Γ (1− λ) and xa ≥ 2Γ (1− λ)

[
xh
(
1− Γ2xh
)
+ λxa
] [
xh
(
1− Γ2xh
)
− λxa
]
= 0
x2a =
Γ
2 (xh+xa)
λ2
(1−Γ2 xh)2
+1
From the condition xh < 2Γ (1− λ), the relation xh
(
1− Γ2xh
)
+ λxa = 0 does not
intercept any point, into the region we are considering and can be omitted. So it is:xa = −
Γ
2λx
2
h + 1λxh Parabola
x2h + x2a = Γ2 (xh + xa) Circumference
Parabola. The first curve is a parabola of the plane (xh , xa). It has the vertex
E
(
1
Γ ,
1
2λΓ
)
. It intercepts the xa = 0 axis in O (0, 0) and in XP
(
2
Γ , 0
)
; the bisector
xa = xh in O (0, 0) and in BP
(
2
Γ (1− λ) , 2Γ (1− λ)
)
. The latter is a border point.
A second border point can be obtained intercepting the parabola with the line
xa = 2Γ (1− λ) and is DP
(
2λ
Γ ,
2
Γ (1− λ)
)
.
Circumference. The second curve is a circumference of the plane (xh , xa). Its
center is C
(
Γ
4 ,
Γ
4
)
and its ray ρ =
√
2
4 Γ.
It intercepts the bisector xa = xh in O (0, 0) and the axes, besides the origin, in
XC
(
Γ
2 , 0
)
and YC
(
0, Γ2
)
.
It intercepts the line xa = 2Γ (1− λ) in the two points:
D1C
(
Γ
4 − 14Γ
√[
Γ2 + 8
(√
2 + 1
)
(1− λ)
] [
Γ2 − 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
]
, 2Γ (1− λ)
)
and
D2C
(
Γ
4 +
1
4Γ
√[
Γ2 + 8
(√
2 + 1
)
(1− λ)
] [
Γ2 − 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
]
, 2Γ (1− λ)
)
.
Finally it intercepts the line xh = 2Γ (1− λ) in the border point
LC
(
2
Γ (1− λ) , Γ4 + 14Γ
√[
Γ2 + 8
(√
2 + 1
)
(1− λ)
] [
Γ2 − 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
])
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Fig. A2.1
5.1.3.1. The fixed points.
In order to determine the fixed points of the region h0a1 and, by symmetry, of h1a0,
we have to consider the mutual positions of the two curves above. Of course we are
only interested in their segments compatible with the constraints.
In the following, we will identify a set of necessary, basic conditions.
Parabola. About this curve, it is to be noted that its point DP may be at the left,
or at the right of BP . Comparing the first coordinates of these points, we can see
that it depends whether is λ < 12 , or λ >
1
2 , respectively.
When DP is at the right of BP , or, as limit position, DP is on BP , all the parabola
lies out of the boundaries and there are no fixed points into the region h0a1. Con-
sequently, we will suppose 0 < λ < 12 .
1
Circumference. We requires that the circumference intercepts the border lines
xa,h = 2Γ (1− λ), that is Γ2 ≥ 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ).
Again we requires that D1C  DP  D2C (where “a  b” means “a is not at the right
of b”).
We will develop them under the hypothesis 0 < λ < 12 :
D1C  DP ⇒ Γ2 − 8λ ≤
√[
Γ2 + 8
(√
2 + 1
)
(1− λ)
] [
Γ2 − 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
]
DP  D2C ⇒ Γ2 − 8λ ≥ −
√[
Γ2 + 8
(√
2 + 1
)
(1− λ)
] [
Γ2 − 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
]
It involves Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4.
Hence:
1It is also to be noted that, for λ < 12 the vertex E of the parabola is above the bisector, while
for λ > 12 E is below the bisector
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
Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 ≥ 8
(√
2− 1
)
(1− λ)
0 < λ < 12
Into the plane (λ,Γ2), the first relation is a parabola, while the second is a line
tangent to the parabola (see the next figure).
Fig. A2.2
Therefore the conditions may be simplified:
Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 40 < λ < 12 [ζ1]
We will assume them from now on.
The useful intervals.
Now, let’s suppose to fix Γ and move λ into the interval
(
0, 12
)
. In such a way, of
the two curves, only the parabola will move, the circumference not being affected
by the parameter λ.
The parabola will always pass through the points O and XP independent of λ;
the abscissa of the vertex will remain stable on 1Γ , while the ordinate will change,
extending or contracting the curve itself.
Exactly, until the parameter λ is diminishing, the vertex E goes up along the vertical
line xh = 1Γ ; on the contrary, when λ is increasing, E goes down.
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Moving λ, also the lines xa,h = 2Γ (1− λ) are affected, contracting towards the
origin, or expanding in the opposite direction, respectively when λ is increasing or
diminishing. Finally, the point BP goes up and down along the bisector, in the same
way.
In the following, we will consider four steps.
We will see three types of figures. The first ones are drawn in the plane (xh , xa)
and are made by the two curves (respectively the parabola and the circumference)
generating the fixed points. The second type represents figures drawn in the plane
(λ , Γ2); they are relative to the existence conditions. Finally, the third ones come
from the steady state conditions M (yht, yat) = (yht, yat) for some particular choices
of the parameters and, as usual, they only have an explanatory purpose; they cover
the plane (yh , ya).
First step: Γ = 2
√
1− λ.
At the beginning, we may consider the particular situation in which the parabola
and the circumference intercept each other on the bisector; this happens when
Γ = 2
√
1− λ (or λ = 1 − Γ24 ) that is compatible with the necessary conditions [ζ1]
above.
Let’s indicate with Q1 = BP = Bc the common point between the two curves.
We ask if they also pass through an other point on “Nord-West”, inside the bound-
aries. It depends from the slope of the curves in Q1 = BP = Bc.
The slope of the tangent at the parabola in BP is mP (BP ) = −1−2λλ .2
The slope of the tangent at the circumference in BC is mC (BC) = −13
Then the two curves have the same slope for λ = 13 and mP (BP ) ≷ mC (BC) for
λ ≷ 13 (the circumference is steeper/less steep than the parabola).
Therefore, for λ ≥ 13 , the two curves, a part from Q1 and the origin, have not any
further interceptions.
Indeed, for λ < 13 , a new interception Q2 appears on Nord-West.
Some further hypotheses, will allow us to know if Q2 lies into the boundaries, or
not.
Meantime, it is to be noted that, for Γ = 2
√
1− λ , λ R 13 ⇔ Γ Q 23
√
6
2In fact, deriving with respect to xh the expression of the parabola, we have dxadxh = − Γ2λxh + 1λ .
The result comes substituting the coordinates of BP .
3Deriving by xh into the equation of the circumference, it is dxadxh =
Γ−4xh
4xa−Γ and result comes
substituting xa = xh.
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Fig. A2.3 Fig. A2.4 Fig. A2.5
Second step: Γ ≤ 23
√
6.
With this hypothesis, when the two curves pass through the common point
Q1 = BP = Bc ( that is when λ = 1− Γ24 ) the circumference is steeper than (or, at
least, as steep as) the parabola.
Then, for λ ≥ 1− Γ24 there are not any interceptions inside the boundaries.
On the other hand, for λ < 1− Γ24 the point Q2 appears on Nord-West.
Combining the hypothesis Γ ≤ 23
√
6 (i.e. Γ2 ≤ 83) and the relation λ < 1− Γ
2
4 , with
the [ζ1], we obtain the conditions by which Q2 lies into the boundaries:
Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 ≤ 83
Γ2 < 4 (1− λ)
0 < λ < 12
⇒ One steady state exists in each region h0a1, h1a0
The resulting set is nonempty; one steady state appears in h0a1 and, symmetrically,
in h1a0.
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Fig. A2.6
Fig. A2.7 Fig. A2.8 Fig. A2.9
Third step: Γ > 23
√
6 and λ ≤ 1− Γ24 .
As usual, we begin with λ = 1 − Γ24 . The parabola intercepts the circumference in
Q1 = BP = Bc and there, is steeper than the circumference.
It follows that the two curves have another common point Q2 situated on Nord-West
then, into the boundaries.
Diminishing λ, the parabola goes up, the point Q2 moves towards the left, and it
eventually remains the only valid interception between the two curves.
The conditions by which Q2 stays into the boundaries are:
Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 > 83
Γ2 < 4 (1− λ)
0 < λ < 12
⇒ One steady state exists in each region h0a1, h1a0
Even in this case the resulting set is nonempty and it involves two symmetric steady
states, one in each region.
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Fig. A2.10 Fig. A2.11
Fourth step: Γ > 23
√
6 and λ > 1− Γ24 .
Let’s suppose to increase λ up to 1− Γ24 .
The parabola goes down and the same does the line xa = 2Γ (1− λ). Two valid
interceptions Q1 and Q2 appear into the boundaries.
The dynamic will stop when the two points reach each other and the parabola is
tangent to the circumference.
The determination of the point of tangent between the parabola and the
circumference.
To continue our development, we have to obtain the relation of tangent between the
parabola and the circumference.
In order to do that, we have to consider the third degree equation
Γ2x3 − 4Γx2 + (λΓ2 + 4λ2 + 4)x− 2λΓ (1 + λ) = 0.
It can be reduced substituting x = w + 43Γ and it becomes:
w3 +
(
λΓ2+4λ2− 43
Γ2
)
w + 2Γ2
[
8
3Γ
(
1
9 + λ
2
)
− λΓ
(
1
3 + λ
)]
= 0 .
Setting u = λΓ
2+4λ2− 43
Γ2 and v =
2
Γ2
[
8
3Γ
(
1
9 + λ
2
)
− λΓ
(
1
3 + λ
)]
the condition under
which this equation has two real solutions, is: v24 +
u3
27 = 0.
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Applying that, setting Υ = Γ2 and simplifying, we obtain the relation that involves
the condition of tangent between the two curves:
T (λ,Γ2) =
= λ (Γ2)3+39 (Γ2)2 (λ2 + 18λ− 1)+16Γ2 (3λ3 − 9λ2 − 5λ− 1)+64 (λ4 + 2λ2 + 1) =
0
About this curve, we are interested only on its part into the region 0 < λ < 12 .
There it passes through the point
(
1
3 ,
8
3
)
and has two branches at the left, the upper
of which is the one compatible with the boundaries, while the inferior is out.
Let’s set λT (Γ): T (λ,Γ2) = 0. For each Γ, when λ > λT (Γ), the two interceptions
between the parabola and the circumference disappear.
Finally, these are the conditions by which the system has two interceptions:
Γ2 ≥ 8λ2 − 8λ+ 4
Γ2 > 83
Γ2 > 4 (1− λ)
0 < λ ≤ λT (Γ) < 12
⇒ Two steady states exist in each region h0a1, h1a0
Fig. A2.12
Fig. A2.13 Fig. A2.14 Fig. A2.15 Fig. A2.16
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6. Appendix to Chapter III
6.1. Proofs of propositions of Chapter 3
6.1.1. Proposition 3.3. Proof.
The steady state of autarky is P ? =
(
[(1− α) Γh]
1
1−α , [(1− α) Γa]
1
1−α
)
We will consider it into each of the four regions of the plane Ω = (yht > 0)∩(yat > 0).
6.1.1.1. Into the region h0a0
Considering the map into this region and substituting the coordinates of the point
P ?, we obtain:
Mh0a0 (P ?) :

[(1− α) Γh]
1
1−α = 1
τ(P ?)
(
αΓhλh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
[(1− α) Γa]
1
1−α = 1
τ(P ?)
(
αΓaλa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
with the conditions Γj < (1−λj)
1−α
1−α for j = h , a,
being τ (P ?) =
Lh
(
αΓhλh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
+La
(
αΓaλa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
Lh[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α+La[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
.
Dividing, member by member, the first relation with the second, it results:
λh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
= λa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
Substituting this last into τ (P ?) it is:
τ (P ?) =
(
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
)(
αλa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
(1−α)
1
1−α
(
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
) = 1
(1−α)
1
1−α
(
αλa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
Finally, substituting into any one relation of the system, it’s easy to see that it
becomes an identity.
This proves that the necessary and sufficient conditions for P ? to stay in h0a0 are:
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
λh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
= λa
1−[(1−α)Γa]
1
1−α
Γh < (1−λh)
1−α
1−α
Γa < (1−λa)
1−α
1−α
6.1.1.2. Into the region h0a1 (and h1a0)
These are the border conditions required:
− h0a1: Γh < (1−λh)
1−α
1−α and Γa ≥ (1−λa)
1−α
1−α
− h1a0: Γh ≥ (1−λh)
1−α
1−α and Γa <
(1−λa)1−α
1−α
We will consider only the region h0a1, being the results perfectly adaptable to the
other one.
The map is
Mh0a1 (P ?) :

[(1− α) Γh]
1
1−α = 1
τ(P ?)
(
αΓhλh
1−[(1−α)Γh]
1
1−α
) 1
1−α
[(1− α) Γa]
1
1−α = 1
τ(P ?) (αΓa)
1
1−α
Dividing side by side the two equations, it comes Γh = (1−λh)
1−α
1−α that is incompatible
with the condition of the system.
So P ? cannot lie into the region h0a1 and, with analogous prove, neither into h1a0.
6.1.1.3. Into the region h1a1
In this region, the map is: Mh1a1 (P?) :
[(1− α) Γh]
1
1−α = (αΓh)
1
1−α
τ(P ?)
[(1− α) Γa]
1
1−α = (αΓa)
1
1−α
τ(P ?)
and the conditions required at borders are yjt ≥ Yj, for j = h , a.
Observing that τ (P ?) =
(
α
1−α
) 1
1−α , it is immediate to verify that P ? may be a
solution.
Therefore, whenever the border conditions are satisfied, the steady state solution
P ? exists.
Consequently, the necessary and sufficient conditions of the problem are:Γh ≥
(1−λh)1−α
1−α
Γa ≥ (1−λa)
1−α
1−α
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6.1.1.4. The stability of P ? into the region h1a1
Now we will prove that P ? is asymptotically stable into the region h1a1.
In fact, the map in that region is:
yht+1 = (1−α)Γ
1
1−α
h
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
(LhΓhyαht + LaΓayαat)
yat+1 = (1−α)Γ
1
1−α
a
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
(LhΓhyαht + LaΓayαat)
Consequently, the jacobian matrix of the system calculated in P ? is:
Jh1a1 (P ?) = α
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
 LhΓ 11−αh LaΓ 11−αh
LhΓ
1
1−α
a LaΓ
1
1−α
a

detJh1f1 (P ?) = 0 ; trJh1f1 (P ?) = α
From µ2 − αµ = 0 we obtain the eigenvalues µ1 = 0 and µ2 = α.
This proves that P ? is a node, asymptotically attractive.
We can also determine the eigenvectors.
For brevity let’s set δ = α
LhΓ
1
1−α
h
+LaΓ
1
1−α
a
For µ1 = 0 the eigenvector can be obtained from δLhΓ
1
1−α
h u11 + δLaΓ
1
1−α
h u12 = 0.
Hence u1 =
[
La
−Lh
]
.
For µ1 = α we have: δLhΓ
1
1−α
h u21 + δLaΓ
1
1−α
h u22 = αu21. Then u2 =
 Γ 11−αh
Γ
1
1−α
a
.
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